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The Soviet Union has, historically, always maintained a
large standing army, primarily for defensive purposes. However,
after World War II and with the advent of nuclear weapons, the
Soviet Armed Forces have undergone tremendous change. This
paper traces the changes in Soviet attitudes towards conven-
tional military force since World War II and attempts to illus-
trate the role of conventional force in Soviet foreign policy.
Postwar Soviet military development is traced through four
distinct phases: 1945-1953 was a period in which the Soviet
military was generally a continental land army; 1954-1959 saw
the introduction of nuclear weapons but little or no change in
strategy and doctrine; the period 1960-1967 saw the birth of
the Strategic Rocket Forces and primary emphasis on nuclear
warfare; and since 1968 the Soviets have been developing both
a strong nuclear capability as well as a modern conventional
force capable of global deployment. In addition to historical
surveys of the phases in military development, detailed analyses
are presented of the Soviet military interventions in Hungary
(1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) as well as Soviet military
support of the MPLA in Angola (1974-1975).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The explosion of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima heralded the
development of an entirely new arsenal of weapons and military-
strategy for future wars. The two superpowers that emerged
from World War II - the United States and the USSR - were to
become involved in an ideological struggle shadowed by a grow-
ing arsenal of nuclear weapons. Terms such as "mutual assured
destruction," "MIRV," "SLBM," "throw weight," "ABM," "SALT,"
and many others related to nuclear weaponry have become common-
place in American newspapers and magazines. For years the U.S.
and USSR have discussed ways of limiting nuclear weapons in
order that neither side gain an advantage over the other. In
short, negotiations have been carried out in an effort to main-
tain a balance such that each nation is a nuclear hostage of
the other. Therefore, for several years there was a trend away
from discussions of the conventional or non-nuclear forces of
the Soviet Union. The withdrawal of American forces from
Vietnam gave the American people a chance to "look around" at
other world events and many became concerned with the quality
of Soviet conventional weaponry used by the Arab nations during
the Arab-Israeli War in October of 1973, as well as the Soviet-
Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975.
In the past year there has been a general acknowledgement
in the U.S. of continued substantial improvements of non-nuclear
forces by the Soviets. Not only have these improvements

increased the Soviet threat to NATO but also have provided the
Kremlin leadership with an expanding global capability that
did not exist a few years ago. In the Annual Defense Depart-
ment Report presented to Congress in January of 1977, Secretary
of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld voiced his concern over the Soviet
build-up of conventional forces.
These modern offensive forces, combined with their increas-
ing capability to project power thousands of miles from
Soviet shores, have not appeared overnight. They are the
result of a steady effort made with great momentum over
considerable time. What is new is Western recognition of
their magnitude and extent
.
Why is the deployment of a strong conventional force by the
Soviet Union so significant? Soviet leaders obviously realize
the risks and consequences of a nuclear conflict with the West
and try to avoid such a holocaust. However, since the end of
World War II the Soviet Union has employed its conventional
forces in several different ways while avoiding a direct con-
frontation with the West. To name only a few: Soviet units
carried out the blockade of Berlin in 1948; Soviet troops in-
tervened in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968; the
Soviets provided arms and military assistance to Mideast and
African nations during the 1960's and 1970' s, and, more recently,
they supported a Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola. An anal-
ysis of the Soviets' use of conventional forces would show that
all have had a political dimension or overtone. In 1954, a
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Annual Defense





Soviet officer writing for the Soviet General Staff organ wrote,
"The objective of military strategy is the creation by military
means of those conditions under which politics is in a position
2
to achieve the aims it sets for itself." Western experts have
indicated that they are also aware of the importance of conven-
tional force as a means of achieving political goals. Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld told Congress :
Conventional military force remains a principal instrument
for pursuing international objectives where military power
is to be used at all.... the primary burden of deterrence
now falls increasingly on conventional forces, although
their effectiveness is enhanced by the nuclear capabilities
that underlie them. .. .Conventional wars appear relatively
controllable, since their tempo tends to be slower, allow-
ing policy makers to act without excessive pressure.
3
Professor John Erickson states it in a more succinct manner.
The attainment by the Soviet Union of nuclear parity....
puts a premium on operations below the nuclear level, for
here is usable military power.... the conduct of operations
below the nuclear level has emphasized the need to improve
tactical performance, as well as preparation for limited
war, that is, both responding to and initiating military
operations at select levels.^
Acknowledging' the importance of conventional military
forces, the military analyst would like to be able to predict
or foresee the events which would induce the Soviet leaders to
employ such forces. However, there are several variables which
must be considered in an attempt to understand such a decision.
2Raymond Garthoff, "Military Power in Soviet Policy," in
The Military and Technical Revolution, Its Impact on Strategy
and Foreign Policy
, ed. , John Erickson (Institute for the Study
of the USSR, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 241,
quoting Colonel S. Kozlov, "Some Questions on Theory of Strategy,"
Vozzenaya mysl, No. 11, 1954, p. 23.
Rumsfeld, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978
,
p. 22.
4John Erickson, "Trends in the Soviet Combined-Arms Concept,"
Strategic Review
,
Winter 1977, Vol. 5, pp. 39-40.
8

Soviet military doctrine and strategy — though tied to the
ideology and doctrine of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union -does reflect the leaders' perception of change, both
internally and externally. Many objective factors which
affect Soviet military doctrine must be considered if one is
analyzing Soviet decision-making. Kremlin leadership is most
certainly always aware of the degree of tension between East
and West. In other words, they are aware of the possibility
of a nuclear confrontation with the West. This is tied closely
to the ever present problem of "strategic balance" and the
degree of "imbalance" the Soviets might perceive. Related to
the strategic balance are the types of weapons available to
the Soviet Union in the event of a general — and obviously
nuclear — war and will have an impact on the Soviet decision
to employ conventional forces for political purposes. Asso-
ciated closely with all of the factors stated above is the role
of military- technological innovation. The state of the art in
weapons technology impacts heavily on Soviet military doctrine
and the nation's ability to involve itself in new military
endeavors. However, it must be remembered that development,
production and deployment of a weapons system is a lengthy
process, requiring a lead time of six to ten years from
See Appendix A for Soviet definitions of military "doctrine"
and "strategy."
Banjamin S. Lambeth, "The Sources of Soviet Military Doc-
trine," Comparative Defense Policy
,
ed . Frank B. Horton III,
Anthony C~. Rogerson and Edward L. Warner III (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1974), pp. 202-207.

7initiation to deployment to operational units. Thus, a Soviet
leader may support development of a new weapon system that might
not become a reality until his successor has come to power.
In addition to the objective variants listed above, there
are some equally important subjective variants that must be
considered. One of the most obvious is the ideology and his-
torical tradition of the Soviet Union. Writers have written
an unending stream of books trying to explain the Soviet way
of carrying on government affairs - the Soviet "standard oper-
ating procedure." This involves an understanding of Soviet
bureaucratic politics. Analysts of the Soviet system have come
o
to realize the importance of interest groups in Soviet politics.
Finally, one must consider the variant of conscious leadership
preference. The leaders of the Soviet Union have all had def-
inite individual styles of leadership. It is in this area that
one can only hope that decisions made by the Soviet leaders are
those of a "rational man" as it is virtually impossible to make
plans or take action in anticipation of irrational decisions.
This is particularly true when the leadership of another nation
is trying to anticipate the Soviet leadership's decision to
employ military force.
The purpose of this paper is to review the Soviet attitudes
toward conventional military force since World War II with an
7William F. Scott, Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and
Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak § Co., Inc., 1975), p. 1.
o
For a detailed study of interest groups, see Interest
Groups in Soviet Politics
, edited by H. Gordon Skilling and
Franklyn Griffith (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press,





attempt to analyze the capabilities of the conventional forces
and their role in supporting Soviet foreign policy. The research
presents a historical survey of phases in Soviet affairs since
1945 characterized by a different foreign policy approach and/or
by a significantly different Soviet strategic position relative
to the United States. Significant changes in Soviet military
doctrine and strategy will be highlighted. Generally speaking,
the phases will closely relate to changes in Soviet leadership
since 1945. However, the objective and subjective variants
discussed earlier have brought about additional phases that do
not correlate exactly with the appearance or demise of principal
Soviet leaders. Not all writers and historians agree exactly
on the start and ending points for these phases. Zbigniew
q
Brzezinski divided the period into six phases while Roman
Kolkowicz outlined four phases in his 1971 work. For the
purpose of this paper, the period surveyed will be divided into
four phases that resemble the development of the Soviet Armed
Forces as presented by General-Major M. I, Cherednichenko of
the Soviet Army.
General Cherednichenko divided the development of the post-
war military in the following way: (1) 1945-1953; (2) 1953-1960
(the first stage of the nuclear period) ; and (3) a phase beginning
9 Zbigniew Brzezinski, How the Cold War was Played,"
Foreign Affairs 51, October 1972.
Roman Kolkowicz, "Strategic Parity and Beyond: Soviet
Perspectives," World Politics 23, April 1971.
11

in 1960 (the second stage of the nuclear period) . According
to Cherednichenko , "Substantial changes in military art have
taken place at definite periods, on the average of every 6-8
12years." For the purpose of this paper, the third phase will
end in 1967 and a fourth phase covering the period 1967 to 1977
will be discussed. This will be considered the period when
13
"flexible response" is added to Soviet military doctrine.
Each of the four phases will be reviewed in a very general
sense. The Soviet foreign and domestic policy goals and objec-
tives applicable to each phase will be presented. In addition,
the Soviet military capabilities applicable to each phase will
be presented, with emphasis on conventional forces. In this
way, it should be possible to relate changes in Soviet domestic
and foreign policies with changes in Soviet military doctrine
and the accompanying changes in emphasis on specific weaponry.
It is these two factors — goals/objectives and military capa-
bilities — which must be weighed against the anticipated response
or reaction by both a "target country" and the Western powers,
basically the U.S., to allow analysis of the Soviet decision to
employ or not employ conventional military force. To provide
specific illustration of the applicability of these factors,
M. I. Cherednichenko, "On Features in the Development of
Military Art in the Postwar Period," Military Historical Journal
,
No. 6, Moscow, June 1970, pp. 19-30, quoted in Selected Soviet
Military Writings 1970-1975: A Soviet View, translated and
published under the auspices of the United States Air Force




13 For a graphical presentation of the phases described by
Brzezinski, Kolkowicz and Cherednichenko, see Appendix B.
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an analysis of three incidents involving the actual employment
of Soviet conventional military forces in one form or another
will be presented. These incidents will be the Soviet inter-
ventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the
Soviet support of war by proxy in Angola from 1975-1976.
13

II. PHASE ONE - 1945-1953
The first phase in postwar Soviet affairs to be surveyed
coincides with the final years of Stalin's leadership in the
Kremlin. The end of World War II - or the Great Patriotic War
as it is called in the Soviet Union - signalled the beginning
of a new era in Soviet history. The USSR emerged as one of
the Great Powers as well as leader of a greatly expanded Social-
ist world. Weakened and ravaged by the war with Germany and
faced with the task of consolidating their gains in Eastern
Europe, the Soviet leaders saw their ideology and political
system threatened by the one nation that had displayed the
capability for atomic warfare - the United States. Stalin's
strong, tyrannical control over all affairs of the Soviet Union,
to include military planning, was later to be the key to under-
standing what actually took place with respect to military
doctrine and strategy during the immediate postwar period.
A. SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES
As World War II came to a close, the Soviet Union was faced
with a period of reconstruction and concentration upon indus-
trial and military growth. Stalin could not overlook the fact
that not only did the U.S. have a head start in the advanced
technology of the nuclear age but also the U.S. was deeply in-
volved in the affairs of Europe. Stalin was faced with two
major problems: (1) the USSR had to keep the U.S. from exploiting
14

unrest in Eastern Europe or reacting in a dangerous manner to
Stalin's political moves that were calculated to take advantage
of disagreement among the Western powers; and (2) he had to set
the course for the USSR during a period of vulnerability that
existed while the Soviets struggled to overcome the nuclear
14
advantage of the West.
Many of Stalin's troubles were the result of the two con-
flicting views of world order that existed throughout Europe.
Most of the European nations, recovering from the second major
war in less than fifty years, shared a "universalist view."
The universalists believed that all nations shared a common
interest in the affairs of the world and they assumed national
security could be guaranteed by all nations working together.
However, the Soviet Union supported a "sphere of influence view"
by which each great power would be predominant in its area of
special interest. In this view, the Soviets assumed that
national security would be guaranteed by the existing balance
of power. The sphere of influence view allowed the Russians
to protect their frontiers jealously - especially their border
to the west. While it was this view that fueled the Cold War,
it did allow the Russians to consolidate gains in East Europe
as well as shore up holes in their domestic affairs.
14
Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 13.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War,"
in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy
,
ed. Erik P. Hoffman






Domestically, Stalin had to gain control of the Russian
people and once again surround them with the "protective
blanket" of communism. Ideology had proved insufficient in
rallying the people of the USSR during the war and Stalin was
forced to rely on the spirit of nationalism and "defense of
the fatherland" as well as help from the Church to rally the
population of the Soviet Union. With the war over, the "frivo
lous behavior" of the war years had to be erased. Stalin had
to reclaim the masses of people that had been removed from
Soviet control and Soviet soil and then reindoctrinate them.
By the summer of 1946, a full scale ideological campaign was
opened against those Soviet citizens that had been exposed to
the West and expressed admiration for Western culture and
society. Stalin needed "true believers" of the communist
ideology if he was to carry out the economic recovery of the
USSR. 16
Economically, the USSR had suffered war losses almost
beyond description. Stalin instituted the Fourth Five-Year
Plan to run from 1946 to 1950. The Plan's goal was not only
to provide economic recovery but also to raise output higher
than that of 1940. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-1955) pro-
jected a continuous, substantial rise in production. Allocat-
ing its resources as only a totalitarian state can, the USSR
achieved a level of production that approached that of
Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia
,
3d ed.
(Chicago: Rand McNally § Co., 1972), pp. 440-443.
16

Western Europe. While heavy industry grew, light industry and
the output of consumers' goods lagged drastically. Stalin was
intent on accomplishing his economic goals without regard for
the needs of the people. His domestic goals had to be met to
1 7
allow him to carry out his goals in East Europe.
East Europe provided Stalin the opportunity to establish
a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.
It was extremely important to him that the Soviet Union gain
and maintain control of the East European nations. With the
exception of Yugoslavia and Albania, the Red Army occupied all
of East Europe. It is obvious now that Stalin was not "saving"
those nations from Hitler's armies to enable them to reappear
after the war as democratic, independent states. As Stalin
once told Tito, "This war is not as in the past; whoever
occupies a territory also imposes his own system as far as his
18
army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."
At the Yalta Conference in 1945, Stalin indicated that the
future security of the USSR depended upon the establishment of
governments in East Europe friendly to the Soviets. It was
this point that was to create such disagreement between Stalin
and the Western leaders in later years as it was not possible
to have a government that was friendly to the USSR and still
satisfy the Western Powers' definition of a democracy. In





Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin
,
trans. Michael





zone of influence. Stalin's goal was the Sovietization of
East Europe - the establishment of Communist-controlled govern-
ments.
The Sovietization of East Europe included a complete break
with the West. The rejection of the Marshall Plan for both
the USSR and the governments of East Europe in June of 1948
marked the irreversible turning point in the affairs of those
governments. But, Stalin did not stop there as he began a
militant campaign against Western Europe which included attacks
on the Marshall Plan. The campaign also included: attempts
by the French and Italian Communist Parties to topple their
governments using tactics involving strikes and mass movements;
the coup in Czechoslovakia; efforts to gain control of Yugo-
slavia from Tito; and the carrying out of the blockade of Berlin
In January of 1949, Moscow introduced an organization in East
Europe that was in some ways the Soviet answer to the Marshall
Plan - the Council for Economic-Mutual Assistance (CEMA) . It
was to provide for pooling of resources and division of labor
integrated with Soviet economic plans. Yet, Stalin was not
satisfied with his efforts and was concerned with the possi-
bility of his actions bringing about greater unity among the
Western Powers. He had to let jap on the pressure.
A new policy evolved in the spring of 1949 about the same
time the Berlin blockade was lifted. Stalin changed his tactics
19William Hardy McNeil, American, Britain and Russia: Their
Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (New York: Johnson Reprint
Corporation, 1970), p. 533.
18

to try and disrupt the cohesion and common defense efforts of
the West. He sided with the "Peace Movement" by verbally
attacking the dangers of German remilitarization and arousing
the popular feeling against nuclear warfare. Reasons for the
new policy doubtlessly included a need to slow growing trends
in Western unity, an opportunity to pay closer attention to
the incorporation of East Europe into the Soviet sphere and
the need to buy time while Soviet technology improved in order
20
to shift the balance of power between the USSR and the West.
In summary, the Soviet goals and objectives in the postwar
years involved "continental problems" such as the consolidation
of gains in East Europe and the economic reconstruction of the
USSR.
B. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY
Historically, Russia has always had a large standing army.
However, the presence of a strong military force in the Soviet
Union is significant not only as a potential adversary of Western
armies but also as a threat to Communist Party hegemony within
the USSR. Since the October Revolution of 1917, Soviet leaders
have recognized the need for powerful armed forces and yet have
maneuvered affairs of state in such a way that the military
never achieved a position which would put it beyond control of
the Party. This was proved again immediately after WW II.
Following the war, Stalin severely limited the power and
prerogatives of the military leaders. In fact, he encouraged




sweeping reassertion of control in the military by Party
"apparatchiks." In February 1946, Stalin made a public state-
ment indicating the war had been won because of the superiority
of the Soviet political and social system and not through the
brave efforts of Russian troops. The Party's anti-military
attitude was once again demonstrated when it upgraded the
political organs' authority over the military while undercut-
ting that of the commanders. Furthermore, Stalin encouraged
the belief that he was the father of the military doctrine
21
which had brought about the victory over Germany.
Stalin's military science was typical of the deterministic
rigidity and the pseudo-scientific apparatus characteristic of
Marxist-Leninist teaching. Stalin believed there were certain
principles that determined the outcome of the war; he called
those "permanently operating factors." The factors included:
(1) stability of the rear; (2) morale of the army; (3) quantity
and quality of divisions; (4) the armament of the army; and
(5) the organizing ability of the command personnel. (Stalin
believed the factor of strategic surprise was of only secondary
importance.) He insisted the Soviet officer corps rely solely
on those factors in determining military theory. Additionally,
he insisted that the military leaders base all future activities
on the lessons learned from the Great Patriotic War. The result
was a contradiction between the technological revolution and
21Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist





and the persistent conservatism in Soviet military thinking.
Stalin was glorifying the past while struggling to face the
immediate problem of trying to restrain a nuclear-armed oppon-
ent - the United States.
When the war ended, the Soviet Union is said to have had
almost 12,000,000 men in uniform. Although that number was
reduced drastically in the next few years (to a level of between
2,800,000 and 4,000,000 men in 1948), the Soviet leaders left
a large combined-arms force of ground troops and tactical air-
craft in East Europe. That force created the impression the
Soviets were capable and prepared to advance rapidly to the
English Channel. In essence, the threat of a Soviet land-power
23
was the counterbalance to U.S. nuclear power. In essence,
it appeared Western Europe was held hostage by Stalin. Stalin
was determined to appear strong in spite of weaknesses in the
Soviet armed forces.
The first major reorganization of Soviet military forces
after the initial postwar demobilization occurred in 1948.
While some organizational changes occurred, military units
generally retained WW II equipment. It was not until about
1950 that postwar equipment was introduced into the military
and changes in training applicable to the more modern equipment
began. Battlefield mobility and firepower for field armies








improvements in armored equipment. Priority was given to
Soviet forces deployed against West Europe as those forces
24
were among the very best in the Soviet military.
Reorganization of the Air Force took the form of a consol-
idation resulting in the reduction in total number of aircraft
from 20,000 in 1945 to 15,000 in 1946. Unlike the U.S. which
had developed and expanded the role of strategic bombing, the
Soviet Air Force was more tactically oriented. The majority of
25the immediate postwar force was for support of ground armies.
However, Stalin realized the impact of the Allied strategic
bombing of Germany and placed great emphasis on the development
of a long-range bomber force and a defensive jet fighter force.
The most significant jet fighter developed was unveiled
in December of 1946. The MIG-15, using the latest British jet
engine technology, entered mass production with the total out-
put eventually reaching 15,000 aircraft. By the end of the
Korean War the MIG-17 was being mass produced and, .with the
MIG-15, became the mainstays of both tactical aviation and the
air defense interceptor force.
The Soviet air defense forces initially were composed of
WW II type fighters and large numbers of anti-aircraft artillery
However, it was not capable of defending against targets pene-




25 Robert A. Kilmarx, A History of Soviet Air Power (New





interceptor force increased in size from about 1,000 aircraft
in 1948 to more than 2,000 aircraft in 1953 by which time it
had been converted to an all jet force. Nevertheless, through-
out the entire Stalinist period, the air defense system suffered
from serious deficiencies which included: lack of all-weather
interceptors, inadequate ground control intercept radars, and
a force unable to provide air defense for the entire immense
27Soviet land mass. Soviet aircraft design bureaus began work
on developing more advanced fighter aircraft but they did not
become a reality until after Stalin's death in 1953.
Like the air defense forces, the postwar Soviet Navy suf-
fered from many deficiencies. The strength of the Navy was at
an all-time low and Stalin therefore gave his support to a
long-range program to develop a balanced naval fleet. The
first efforts involved ships of prewar design for defense of
the coastal waters of the Soviet Union. By 1950, Stalin sup-
ported a ten-year naval plan calling for construction of large
2 8
surface fleets and large numbers of medium range submarines.
While the primary mission of the Navy was to defend the Soviet
state, Soviet military successes of WW II had expanded the ter-
ritory of the Soviet Union and provided greater naval access
to adjacent areas. Postwar geography seemed to support Stalin's
1930 decision to construct major warships. However, Stalin had
visions of a conventional navy and did not make plans for the
integration of nuclear weapons.
27Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe
, pp. 48-49.
2 8
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Soviet
Sea Power (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and Inter
national Studies, June 1969), pp. 36-41.
23

Stalin, nevertheless, was interested in nuclear weapons
and delivery systems for those weapons. The Soviets exploded
their first atomic device in August 1949. When nuclear weapons
were initially introduced into operational Soviet forces early
in the fifties, the primary delivery systems were the TU-4
piston medium bomber and later the IL-28 jet bomber. These
aircraft were capable of attacking Europe and the periphery
of the Eurasian landmass but were not capable of flying inter-
continental missions. The initial emphasis on striking European
targets carried over into the development of early ballistic
missiles although they were not operationally deployed until
after Stalin's time. Stalin is given credit for initiating
programs of research and development that ultimately brought
about intercontinental bomber and missile delivery systems
29during the period of Khrushchev's leadership.
Roman Kolkowicz characterized Soviet military policy during
Stalin's postwar years as having
....a basic reliance on massive conventional forces deployed
in an active defense posture with a narrow, continental
mission. .. .Although modern military weapons were being
introduced into the Soviet military establishment, Stalin
continued to force his strategists to "look back" to the
successful Russo-German war .... Stalin, who had initiated a
massive crash program for the development of atomic weapons
soon after the war, did not consider the radical implica-
tions of such weapons for the nature of future war.... 30
29Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe
, pp. 36-41.
Kolkowicz, "Strategic Parity and Beyond," p. 431.
24

Raymond Gartcrff provides an excellent summary of Soviet
military doctrine during the period in question.
....In 1946, the Workers' and Peasants' Army was renamed
the "Soviet Army," a change reflecting the long-maturing
and significant evolution of that body from the early
revolutionary army of the civil war to a national army
and arm of the state. This change was one of many that
cumulatively marked a shift of political structure. As
in other sectors of Soviet society, the postwar tasks of
the armed forces were concentrated on the build-up of the
power of the Soviet state, and of the Communist Bloc, for
the long run. .. .Efforts were concentrated on modernizing
the armed forces as a whole, on providing a token long-
range air force armed with nuclear weapons, and on devel-
oping advanced weapons systems for the future. Military
doctrine continued virtually unchanged, and in 1953 was
simply an elaboration and canonization of Soviet military
doctrine of 1945. But the slowly developing military
thinking was not incongruous with the virtually unchanged
and single-minded role of the instrument in Soviet policy:
for defense in the unlikely case that an enemy should
attack, and to garrison and maintain the new Soviet empire
The only overt use of military power had been the rather
conservative one of remaining where they had advanced to
during the war, while political means were employed in
most, though not all, situations to acquire this occupied
territory. Nonetheless, the Soviet armed forces were
developing into an instrument with other potentialities.,
which would later be recognized as Soviet political stra-
tegy reawakened. 31
31 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy (New York
Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 23.
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III. PHASE TWO: 1953-1960
The second postwar phase to be surveyed is highlighted by
the problems of succession following Stalin's death in 1953.
Politically, almost the entire period was affected by Khrush-
chev's struggle for power and his eventual attainment of lead-
ership in both Party and state. Bureaucratic infighting over
personal issues and resource allocation affected not only
foreign policy matters but also Soviet military affairs. How-
ever, the world saw a drastic change in the Soviet participation
in world affairs during this period. While Stalin is credited
with making the USSR a world power, Khrushchev shook loose the
restraints of continental concerns and pursued a diplomacy
which was to transform the nation into a global power.
A. SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES
Following Stalin's death, the Soviet Presidium appeared to
favor a collective leadership. However, the real power was in
the hands of Malenkov, Beria and Molotov. Malenkov, designated
by Stalin as his heir, immediately assumed the positions of
Prime Minister and Party Secretary. Fearing Malenkov' s power,
the other collective leaders forced him to relinquish one of
his positions. Malenkov chose the Prime Ministership and
Khrushchev was selected as Party Secretary. Beria became the
head of a newly consolidated secret police which saw the merg-
ing of the MGB and MVD . Molotov retained his position as
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
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What appeared to be a smooth transition of power was short-
lived, as Beria was purged within four months. Fear of the power
he controlled with his secret police drove the other Soviet
leaders to eliminate him in an attempt to guarantee some sta-
bility. With the element of physical violence - the secret
police - removed, the struggle for leadership took a political
form.
The dispute that arose between Khrushchev and Malenkov was
to affect not only domestic affairs but also the formulation
of foreign policy. Khrushchev, in late 1953, concentrated on
an issue that was to increase his support. The issue was
agriculture or, more importantly, the need for greater efforts
in the "agricultural front." In early 1954, he instituted his
"virgin lands" program in which millions of acres of land in
Soviet Asia were plowed up and sown. Through his efforts in
agricultural policy, Khrushchev realized an increase in his
32power. He was then ready to expand his "interests" and
"pressures ."
In Au gust 1953, Malenkov announced his support for the
development of light industry and consumer goods at the expense
of traditional heavy industry. The development of light indus-
try was to have brought about a faster rise in the standard of
living for the Soviet people. However, Malenkov ran into direct
opposition from Khrushchev. Khrushchev refused to endorse the
Malenkov plan and instead supported the role of heavy industry





in equipping agriculture which he believed was the most
important task in the economic life of the USSR. Additionally,
he stressed the importance of heavy industry for the mainten-
ance of a strong military defense.
Defense policy was to be the other major disagreement
between Khrushchev and Malenkov. In March 1954, Malenkov made
a unilateral statement that nuclear war would result in "the
destruction of world civilization." He was determined to
bolster light industry and therefore stressed that external
risks had to be avoided in order that East-West tensions would
not require increases in military expenditures. Khrushchev
maintained that nuclear war would destroy capitalism but not
socialism. Khrushchev and his supporters "let out the stops"
in depicting the U.S. as an antagonist which could only be
restrained by a Soviet military build-up. This meant, of
33
course, support of heavy industry.
On 8 February 1955, Malenkov resigned as Chairman of the
Council of Ministers. In his statement he spoke of his "in-
experience," assumed the "guilt" for what he called "the un-
satisfactory state of affairs in agriculture" and admitted
that the policy of basing the economy on heavy industry was
the "only correct" one. On Khrushchev's recommendation,
Bulganin replaced Malenkov as Prime Minister. Khrushchev was
gaining domestically in power and prestige and saw the need
to improve his image in Eastern Europe.
33 Sidney I. Ploss, "Studying the Domestic Determinants of
Soviet Foreign Policy" in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy
,
ed. Erik P. Hoffman § Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. (New York:
Adeline-Atherton, Inc., 1971), pp. 82-83.
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Eastern Europe had not gone unaffected by the death of
Stalin. The post-Stalin changes in the USSR had created the
impression of indecision and weakness. In June 1953, unrest
broke out in two of the Soviet satellites. Strikes in Czech-
oslovakia were put down by the secret police while Soviet
troops were used to crush general strikes in East Berlin. The
Soviets moved to liberalize affairs in Hungary later that summer
to avoid unrest in that country. Restlessness in Eastern Europe
required the individual attention of Khrushchev and Bulganin
in 1955.
In May 1955, the Soviet leaders increased their control
over the affairs of Eastern Europe by signing the Warsaw Treaty
which placed the individual national military forces under
Soviet command. Ashort time later Khrushchev and Bulganin
visited Yugoslavia in an attempt to improve Soviet-Yugoslav
relations. The two governments signed a declaration stating
that "differences in the concrete forms of socialist develop-
ment are exclusively the concern of the peoples of the respec-
34tive countries." The visit dramatized the importance the
Soviets placed on the idea of ideological unity in the Socialist
Bloc. Temporarily satisfied in Eastern Europe, the Soviets
turned to international affairs.
1955 Was the year Khrushchev began to work towards making
the USSR a global power. In May, the Austrian Treaty was signed
and Soviet troops were removed from that country. In July, a




summit meeting of the Big Four was held at Geneva. Although
there were no significant results, Khrushchev benefited from
the "Spirit of Geneva." In September, the Soviets returned
the Porkkala base to Finland, apparently as a means of pres-
suring the U.S. to reduce its bases in Europe. That same
month, the Soviets recognized the Federal Republic of Germany.
Yet, it was not all international statesmanship designed to
ease world pressure. In the summer, a Soviet delegation visited
Cairo and "arranged" for Nasser to purchase arms "from Czecho-
slovakia." Before the year ended, Khrushchev and Bulganin made
a widely acclaimed tour of India, Burma and Afghanistan.
However, even with all the activity in foreign affairs,
Khrushchev remained busy improving his image and increasing
his power in domestic affairs.
The Twentieth Party Congress, held in February 1956, saw
Khrushchev determined to further his personal goals. At a
closed session of the Congress Khrushchev delivered his famous
"secret speech." He attacked the reputation of Stalin in what
some believe was an attempt to identify himself as the leader
of a large group wanting to break with the Stalinist past. By
detailing specific misdeeds of Stalin, many of Khrushchev's
competitors were implicated. Khrushchev also set forth three
sweeping innovations in the international relations of the
communist world. First, he stated his doctrine of peaceful






to reduce tension with the West and lessen the threat of
nuclear war. Second, he proclaimed the doctrine of separate
national roads to socialism. Thirdly, he set forth the idea
of non-violent communist revolutions. Each of these innova-
tions was a radical break with Leninism. All were "prompted
by pragmatic temptations of foreign policy or domestic poli-
tics" and "all were instrumental in precipitating the schism
and polycentrism that subsequently sapped the strength and
resolve of the communist movement."
The response to Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin was
surely more than he ever anticipated. Within a few short weeks
riots broke out in Tbilisi, in the Georgian Republic, and over
a hundred people were killed. The greatest response, and
ultimately the gravest problems for Khrushchev, took place in
Eastern Europe. Stalinist leaders in Poland and Hungary came
under heavy criticism and were eventually replaced. In June
1956, riots broke out in Poland resulting in the death of about
one hundred people before control was regained by the police.
Still, the Poles set out to establish their separate road to
socialism. Khrushchev's personal diplomacy and threat of
military force did not deter the Poles, and Khrushchev relented
The Hungarians were not so easily satisfied. In October 1956,
demonstrations in Budapest supporting the Poles erupted into a
full-fledged revolution. When the Hungarians withdrew from
Robert V. Daniels, "Doctrine and Foreign Policy" in The
Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy
, ed. Erik P. Hoffman and




the Warsaw Pact and declared themselves a neutral country,
the Soviets had to intervene with a strong military force to
regain control of the country and ensure Soviet hegemony in
Eastern Europe. Reaction to the Hungarian affair was worldwide.
Prominent Communists in several Western countries expressed
shock and rage. Domestically, Khrushchev's reputation was also
tarnished. (For a detailed analysis of the Soviet military
intervention in Hungary, see Section VI. A. "Hungary - 1956.")
Khrushchev in 1957 increased his control of domestic affairs
to even greater lengths. The issue of industrial reorganiza-
tion became an important matter involving the Soviet leadership.
Industry was organized into a cumbersome ministerial system
that needed to be reorganized. The method of reorganization
was to be extremely important politically. If the ministries
were broken up only partially, control of industry would still
remain in the hands of the economic bureaucracies. Khrushchev
insisted the reorganization involve transfer of industrial
direction to the provincial level. That would guarantee that
Khrushchev's Party supporters at that level would assume dom-
inant positions. Khrushchev was successful and his control of
domestic affairs again increased. Ironically, in 1958, having
achieved his political objectives, Khrushchev reverted from
fragmented control of industries to larger economic control
3 8
units. However, his success in industrial reorganization
was a major factor in an attempt to depose him in June 1957.
37Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia
, pp. 467-470.
38John A. Armstrong, "The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign
Policy" in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy
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The Soviet leaders in the Presidium saw their careers and
personal power threatened by Khrushchev. Returning from a
trip to Finland, Khrushchev was advised that a majority of
the Presidium - seven of eleven members - had voted for his
resignation. Khrushchev refused to resign and took his case
to the Central Committee. The Central Committee, and the Soviet
military, supported Khrushchev to the dismay of the Presidium
majority. The end result was the "Anti-Party Group" - those
in the Presidium voting against Khrushchev - were stripped
39
of their posts and expelled ^from the Central Committee.
Almost overnight Khrushchev had eliminated his major poli-
tical opposition and replaced them with his supporters. It was
not until May 1958 that Bulganin - initially a supporter of the
"Anti-Party Group" but apparently one of the Presidium members
who "changed his mind" - was eased out of office as Prime Min-
ister. He was replaced by Khrushchev who then held both posi-
40tions, Prime Minister and Party Secretary. Having overcome
all opposition, Khrushchev was in a position to dictate his
policies to the Soviet government.
During the period 1953 to 1959, Khrushchev's attempts to
transform the USSR into a global power was made at the expense
of weakening Soviet control in the socialist world as well as
increasing the danger of confrontation with the U.S. During
the Suez crisis of 1956, the Soviets threatened France and
39 Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political





England with military retaliation using nuclear armed missiles.
After the ceasefire in Egypt, Moscow threatened to use "Soviet
volunteers" to support the Egyptians. In October 1957, the
Soviets developed the story of a Turkish military threat on
Syria. The Soviets threatened that an attack on Syria would
bring a response by the Soviet military. Military units car-
ried out maneuvers in the Black Sea and Transcaucasus as a
show of force. In July 1958, the Soviets again carried out
maneuvers in the Transcaucasus and in Bulgaria when the U.S.
landed marines in Lebanon in response to events in Iraq. How-
ever, the Soviets made only vague threats against intervention
in Iraq by the West. Verbal threats were made in September
1958 as a gesture of support for the Chinese Communists in
their bombardment of Quemoy. The Soviets provided the Chinese
Communists no material support however. In November 1958, the
Soviets demanded West Berlin become a "free city" within six
months. The same demand was made again in 1959; however, the
threats were obviously ineffective.
....Soviet threats have always been vague, with loopholes
for withdrawal; invariably, they have been made only when
Moscow was certain that the Western power or powers were
not going to undertake the actions its retaliatory threats
pertained to; and, in the few instances when the opponents
have acted, Soviet retaliation did not follow. 41
Since 1955 the Soviets have used military aid and assistance
to non-communist countries as an important tool in pursuit of
their foreign policy objectives. Aid was first provided the




countries in the Middle East and this area has maintained a
priority with the Soviets. By 1959 the Soviets had exported
weapons to the Far East, the Indian Sub-Continent , the Middle
East, and Latin America. The Soviet Union's objectives were
initially to offset Western attempts to establish any type of
anti-Soviet alliance in Third World areas. In the long run,
the Soviets were expanding their influence in areas of the
42
world where they had not been active before.
In summary, the domestic and foreign accomplishments of
this phase were closely related to the struggle for succession
following the death of Stalin. They were ultimately designed
to increase the power and prestige not only of the USSR, but
also Khrushchev himself. It was a period of ambivalent goals
and political opportunism and adventurism carried out under
circumstances
B. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY
Under Stalin's leadership the armed forces had been as
apolitical as he could make them. Through the use of the Main
Political Administration (MPA-O, a Party-political control
organization( , the secret police element in the military, and
occasional purges, it had been possible to short-stop any
politically minded military officers. However, the struggle
to keep the military, and the power it wielded, out of politics
diminished after Stalin's death. The support of the military
42Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The
Arms Trade with the Third World
, revised and abridged edition
(New York: Holmes § Meier Publishers, Inc., 1975), pp. 82-84
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became important in the succession struggle, which ultimately-
led to one man's supremacy in the Party.
For two years following Stalin's death, two factions
struggled for control of the Party. Khrushchev, as Party Sec-
retary, had a power base of the Central Committee and Secretar-
iat. Malenkov, as Prime Minister, had a power base of the
Party Presidium and the governmental bureaucracy. The Ministry
of Defense was nominally under the control of the Council of
Ministers and thus under Malenkov' s authority. However,
Malenkov' s plan to develop light industry was not in the inter-
ests of the military. Additionally, Malenkov had expressed
his views on nuclear and the need to avoid such a war. He
stabilized defense spending and it appeared he opposed expan-
sion of the armed forces. Meanwhile, Khrushchev supported
heavy industry and, by stressing the antagonism of the West,
supported the growth of the military. The result was as one
would expect: the military supported Khrushchev. The military
was in a position to play one faction against the other.
Khrushchev wanted the support of the entire military and
used various schemes to achieve it. He relied heavily on his
World War II association with several generals during the
battle of Stalingrad. (Some historians have named the generals
the "Stalingrad Group.") Associates of Khrushchev headed the
sections that controlled promotions both in the Party and the
Ministry of Defense and provided Khrushchev with important
43





sources of influence. Khrushchev appointed several of his
supporters, mostly from the "Stalingrad Group," to positions
of authority in the military. At the same time he gave sup-
port to Marshal Zhukov, one of the most famous WW II military
leaders. Zhukov was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense,
His associates, aptly named "Zhukovites" by Western analysts,
made up a second faction in the military. Nevertheless, both
44factions supported the removal of Malenkov.
After Malenkov' s resignation, from February 1955 to October
1957, Khrushchev and Zhukov had an "alliance of mutual conven-
ience." They seemingly supported one another in consolidating
their individual positions. Zhukov was intent on developing a
modern armed forces with the associated doctrine and training.
Even though Khrushchev continued to appoint members of the
"Stalingrad Group" to positions of authority, Zhukov seemed to
have the upper hand in military affairs. At the Twentieth
Party Congress in February 1956, Zhukov was made a candidate
member of the Presidium of the Party, the first professional
military officer to achieve that status. Zhukov took advantage
of his power and strived to reduce the amount of Party control
in military matters. By 1957, Zhukov had put the professional
military in a position where they had gained in influence in
military affairs relative to the political administration, the





The year 1957 was to see the zenith of Zhukov's power and
popularity. In June, when the "Anti-Party Group" attempted
to remove Khrushchev from power, Zhukov told the Central Com-
mittee the Soviet armed forces would not "permit" anyone to
"bid for power." As a full member of the Presidium by that
time, he spoke on "behalf of the armed forces" and gave their
45
support to Khrushchev as Party leader.
With the fall of the "Anti-Party Group," Khrushchev and
Zhukov appeared to be the most powerful men in the USSR.
Needless to say, Khrushchev did not intend to share that dis-
tinction with anyone. Zhukov had created a military establish-
ment that had become too independent and was almost "non-Party."
Doctrine stressed professional military competence rather than
dominance of the Party. It was only a matter of time before
Khrushchev had to get rid of his potential rival. In October
1957, Zhukov was quietly removed from his position as Minister
of Defense and from the Presidium. When Zhukov fought the
issue, he was publicly disgraced.
The plenum of the Central Committee, which met in October
1957, did more than remove Zhukov from his appointments. The
plenum actually began what was to become a major reform of the
Soviet military. The specific objectives of the reform have
been described in the following way: (1) to break down barriers
between ranks to inhibit elitist tendencies; (2) to establish








the supremacy of the Party by having a collective leadership
(Party and military) at decision-making levels; (3) to
strengthen the Party's channels of control; (4) to involve the
military in local Party affairs so as to inhibit the idea of
exclusiveness in the military; and (5) to specifically make
the Party responsible for defining military strategy, doctrine
and theory.
It was during this phase that a debate over "laws of mili-
tary science" began. Almost thirty years had passed with no
open discussions of military theory by military men. Until
1953, Stalin had been directly responsible for Soviet military
strategy. Following his death, there was a void in the area
of military science. After the Soviets exploded their first
hydrogen bomb in late 1953, there was a spontaneous interest
displayed in the subject of military science. It was not until
the denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev in 1956 that Soviet
military thought was looked at with any depth. Military
history faculties were reorganized at the military academies
to reevaluate the subject. The Soviet generals began to ana-
lyze the use of nuclear weapons in their military maneuvers.
By 1958, the General Staff held secret discussions on problems
which they anticipated in any future war. The following year,
1959, it was agreed upon at the highest levels that Soviet
military doctrine should be revised. The advent of the




ballistic missile was about to change the entire structure and
48doctrine of the Soviet military.
Prior to 1960, although there was a growing emphasis on
Soviet strategic nuclear power, the established belief in the
importance of large theater forces was not really challenged.
Nuclear weapons were considered as a supplement to the capa-
bilities of traditional conventional forces. Therefore, some
of the major events in the affairs of the Soviet military
involved reductions in the size of the traditional forces.
The first troop demobilization program began in 1955 and
lasted almost two years. Supposedly, the Soviet military was
cut by 1,840,000 men from the 1955 total of 5,700,000 men. It
was carried out in an effort to relieve international tensions
as well as provide additional manpower to the civilian sector
of the economy. The second overall troop reduction was carried
out in 1958 and 1959. It accompanied the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Romania in 1958. It was announced that 300,000
men were released from the military, bringing the size of the
armed forces at the end of 1959 to 3,600,000 men. The Soviets
never announced what percentage of the cutback involved Soviet
49forces in Eastern Europe. It is possible the cutbacks allowed
for a decrease in "quantity" while "quality" of weapons improved
drastically.
48Harriet Fast Scott, Editor's Introduction to Soviet
Military Strategy
,
3d ed. , by V. D. Sokolovskiy (New York
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The testing of the first-generation Soviet ICBM began
in the fall of 1957. The missile had many shortcomings, how-
ever, as it was large, unwieldy and required above-ground
emplacement. Khrushchev did not invest heavily in the first-
generation ICBM as he apparently had hopes for an improved
second-generation missile. From 1957 to 1961, only a handful
of missiles were deployed. Several other factors probably
affected the decision to delay large-scale deployment of the
first ICBM - economic pressures, bureaucratic opposition and
the U.S. lead in nuclear weaponry.
Khrushchev also faced a decision on the future of the
strategic bomber program. The program, initiated under Stalin,
had reached a point where a decision had to be made as to the
future size of the bomber force. The Soviets had a new medium
jet bomber, the TU-16 BADGER, and two intercontinental heavy
bombers, the Mya-4 BISON turbojet and the TU-95 BEAR turboprop.
Khrushchev apparently decided the Soviets should have a modest
intercontinental bomber force with a larger medium-range bomber
force to use against Europe. By the late 1950's, 150 to 200
BEAR and BISON were in the inventory in addition to about
1,000 BADGER medium bombers which replaced the old TU-4 BULL.
(U.S. analysts erroneously estimated the Soviets would build
600 to 700 long-range bombers.) Though almost numerically
equivalent, the Soviet bomber force was no match for the U.S.
long-range bomber force.






The Soviet air defense grew in size and importance during
the U.S. effort to develop a strong bomber force. Under
Khrushchev, the Soviets carried out a. major reorganization of
the air defense forces in 1955 and the PVO Strany (Soviet air
defense system) became a separate component of the armed forces
Khrushchev stressed improvements that provided new and more
advanced interceptors as well as technical improvement of
warning and control facilities. The supersonic MIG-19 FARMER
entered operational service in 1955 with some models possessing
all-weather capabilities. New Soviet aircraft were unveiled
at the 1956 Moscow Airshow which were to enter service with
PVO in the 1960's. Yet, the Soviets did not rely entirely on
interceptors as they developed surface-to-air missiles.
The Soviets built a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system to
provide all-weather defense against attack by enemy bombers.
Initial SAM deployment was around Moscow itself with the SA-1.
However, the SA-1 was designed for use against high-altitude
targets and was no good against low-altitude targets. The
Soviets also were concerned with defense against strategic
missile attack. In the late 1950's, work began on the devel-
opment of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. It did not
52become a reality before the 1960's. Soviet concern with






In 1954 the Soviet leadership reevaluated the Soviet Navy,
and it was decided that the dangers of a surprise nuclear
attack were greater than those of a seaborne invasion threat.
The result was the decision to rely on long-range cruise
missiles to be carried by small- to -medium surface ships, diesel
submarines and airplanes. (These cruise missiles still had yet
to be developed.) Once the decision was made, the plan had to
be implemented.
Khrushchev gave the task of implementing the reorganization
of the Navy to Admiral S. G. Gorshkov. (He replaced Kuznetsov
as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in early 1956.) Construction
of cruisers was halted and the mass production of medium-type
submarines was slowed to an eventual halt. Although construc-
tion of destroyer-escorts and subchasers was completed, the
follow-on programs were delayed four years. Seven of the
thirteen largest building ways were converted to construction
of merchant and fishing ships. The Navy was to engage carrier
task forces within range of Soviet air cover by launching
cruise missiles. If the concept had been carried through to
completion, the Navy would have been, with the exception of
strategic missile submarines in the future, a totally defensive
53
navy restricted to home waters.
In 1958, increases in the range of U.S. carrier-based
aircraft meant they could strike the USSR from the eastern
Senate Committee on Commerce and National Ocean Policy
Study, Report on Soviet Oceans Development, S. Res. 222, 94th
Congress, 2d Session, "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy"
by Michael McGwire, pp. 81-82 (1976).
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Mediterranean and the Norwegian Sea. The Soviets reversed
their plans for their "new" concept of operations and decided
to rely on nuclear submarines that would be delivered in the
1960's. Additionally, the Soviets realized the need for im-
provements in their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.
The need to extend the range of their ASW forces brought about
plans for helicopter carriers which would not become opera-
54
tional until the 1970's.
To summarize, Soviet strategy during the period 1953 to
1959 broke away from Stalin's idea of continental defense and
consolidation of gains in the postwar socialist bloc. Though
hindered by bureaucratic infighting as a result of the struggle
for political succession following the death of Stalin, the
military was able to break years of silence and began to ques-
tion the changes in military science brought about by nuclear
weapons. It was during this phase that Soviet leaders were
faced with decisions concerning the future structure and force
composition of the armed forces. They were required to estab-
lish priorities in development of future weapons systems to
include planning for size of force. In effect, the Soviet
military was suffering its greatest growing pains. By the late
1950 's Khrushchev attempted to transform the Soviet successes
in space (SPUTNIK I and II) into a political offensive by using
the Soviet military might as a bargaining chip. He extended




arena with the implied support of a "modern Russian military
force." He waged "conflict" at all levels short of actual war
by both verbal and implied threats of military force. Yet,
the Soviets realized what the consequences would be if a
nuclear war broke out and avoided it at all costs.
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IV. PHASE THREE: 1960-1967
The third phase of the post-World War II Soviet affairs
to be surveyed coincides approximately with Khrushchev's last
five years in power (1960-1964) and the first two to three
years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Militarily, it was
during this phase, at least during the Khrushchev years, that
the Soviets turned towards a nuclear strategy which saw the
rise of the Strategic Rocket Forces with less emphasis on the
historically important conventional forces - primarily the
Red Army. Politically, Khrushchev continued his pursuit of
a global strategy in the wake of Soviet space accomplishments
in the late 1950's which he attempted to equate with military
power. Khrushchev suffered serious setbacks, both within the
Socialist world and without, in rather serious confrontations
with the United States and Western powers. Domestically, his
regime suffered from economic and agricultural problems. While
his successors did not drastically change Soviet affairs per se,
they did pursue more cautious policies. In effect, Brezhnev
and Kosygin were forced to work with what Khrushchev had left
them and did not immediately make any major changes in Soviet
affairs
.
A. SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES
From 1958 until the middle of 1960, the Soviets attempted
to translate the achievements of 1957 - the orbiting of the
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first space satellite and testing of the first intercontinental
ballistic missile - into a political advantage in foreign
affairs. The result went from the extreme of applying pressure
in Berlin in 1958 - hoping to gain political concessions - to
less critical foreign affairs involving increased efforts to
develop Soviet influence in the new nations of Africa and Asia.
Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. in October 1959 appeared to
set the stage for future U.S. -Soviet relations. The "spirit
of Camp David" seemed to offer hope for the solutions of some
of the problems the Soviets faced in foreign affairs - mainly
Berlin-West Germany. In an apparent display of East-West
detente, plans were made for a summit meeting in 1960.
Unfortunately, 1960 did not produce a continuation of "the
spirit of Camp David." Following the U-2 incident early in
May 1960 and the collapse of the Summit Conference later that
month, it was obvious Khrushchev was not going to get U.S.
concessions on Berlin or East Germany with or without Soviet
achievements in space and missile weaponry. Just the opposite
happened: The U.S., sensing a "missile gap," intensified its
efforts in missile weaponry. Following the testing of its
first intercontinental missile and the launching of the first
Polaris submarine, the U.S. began missile production efforts
such that the strategic balance was in their favor in the
years to follow. The result was that, rather than capitalizing
on the publicity of the scientific achievements of 1957, the
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Soviets were adversely affected. Unfortunately for the
Soviets, there were other problems developing in their "back
yard."
A Sino-Soviet rift had been growing for several years.
The USSR had played a role in Communist Party affairs in China
since well before World War II. However, it was not until the
late 1950' s that trouble began to appear. Peking was concerned
with military (i.e., nuclear) aid from the Soviets as well as
Soviet support of the Peking policy regarding Taiwan. Khrush-
chev apparently believed that if he could keep nuclear weapons
out of the hands of the Communist Chinese, the West would do
the same with respect to West Germany. In June 1959, the
Soviets tore up the 1957 nuclear sharing agreement with the
Chinese. During their visit in Peking in October, after his
U.S. visit, Khrushchev hinted that a "two-China" solution
should be accepted. By the spring of 1960, the Chinese were
indirectly criticizing the Soviets .in writing with more direct
and open criticism at international meetings later in the year.
To make matters worse, the small Eastern European country of
Albania supported the Chinese. The giant - the Soviet Union -
was criticized and embarrassed by a small, insignificant country
- Albania - and could do little about it because of the Chinese
Communists. In August of 1960, the Soviets withdrew all
Marshall D. Schulman, "Recent Soviet Foreign Policy:
Some Patterns in Retrospect," in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign
Policy
,
ed. Erik P. Hoffman and Frederick J. Fleron, Jr.
(New York: Adeline-Atherton, Inc., 1971), pp. 452-453.
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technicians from China and terminated technical assistance
programs. Peking accused the Soviets of being "revisionists"
and not following the ideals of Lenin. Yet, there was no clean
break between the two countries - Peking remained a growing
thorn in Khrushchev's side. He was aware of the importance
of the appearance of unity between the USSR and PRC as he
devised new plans for dealing with the west.
Following the Bay of Pigs disaster in Cuba in April 1961,
Khrushchev apparently felt he could frighten the young President
Kennedy. At a meeting of the two leaders in Vienna in June,
Khrushchev threatened to sign a treaty with East Germany in
December if there was no treaty with West Germany by then. If
the East German treaty was signed, the Western powers would
have had to negotiate access to Berlin with the East German
government. Additionally, Khrushchev told Kennedy that the
U.S. would have to accept Soviet conditions for a nuclear test
ban. Kennedy was supposedly expected to bow to the Soviet
demands.
The U.S. reaction to threats concerning Berlin was not as
the Soviets must have expected. Instead of quaking in fear,
the U.S. showed its resolve and recalled some of its reserve
forces. The Soviets, in turn, recalled some reservists. Soviet
threats and pressures continued - along with the construction
of the Berlin Wall - and included interference with Western
Harry Gelman, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict," in The China
Reader: Communist China, Revolutionary Reconstruction and
International Confrontations
,
ed. Franz Schurmann and Orville
Schell. (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 275-280.
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air routes into Berlin and actual confrontations between
Western and Soviet tank units in Berlin. Escalation of the
crisis became more possible each day.
In an obvious attempt to put more pressure on the West,
the USSR ended the three-year moratorium on nuclear testing
in August with an explosion of the largest nuclear device yet
tested by any power. The U.S. responded with its own nuclear
testing and development of more advanced missiles. The U.S.
was obviously quite concerned with the crisis in Berlin as
well as the dramatic Soviet nuclear testing. However, the U.S.
did not back down as the Soviets expected. Rather, the Soviets
57
were forced to "cool" the situation.
Khrushchev cooled the Berlin situation when he sent a per-
sonal note to Kennedy in September of 1961. The Soviet appear-
ance at the reopening of disarmament negotiations in March of
1962 seemed to reduce tensions even further. However, 1962
was to be the year of Khrushchev's most daring efforts to
achieve a nuclear parity. In the summer and fall of that year
the Soviets attempted a short-cut towards that parity by the
emplacement of medium and short-range missiles in Cuba. By
targeting the U.S. from Cuba, the Soviets would have been able
to find a "fix" for their lack of intercontinental missiles.
However, in the face of U.S. resolve the plan was aborted and
the missiles were returned to the USSR. The world sat and
watched the worst crisis in international affairs since World
57Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistance: Soviet Foreign
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War II subside. Not only were his plans foiled, Khrushchev's
reputation both in the Soviet Union and throughout the Socialist
bloc suffered.
Following the Cuban missile crisis, the foreign policy of
the USSR showed a definite shift in emphasis over the next two
years. As a result of the crisis, several steps were taken to
improve detente. Rather than attempt to specifically reduce
U.S. military effort and cohesion of the Western powers, the
Soviets turned to measures that appeared to lessen the conflict
relationship with the U.S. while reducing the risk of general
war and limiting the amount of military expenditures required.
Khrushchev became more willing to discuss arms control meas-
ures. In July 1963, he accepted a U.S. proposal for a test
ban in outer space, the atmosphere and under water. Addition-
ally, the Soviets agreed to a "hot line" between Washington,
D.C. and Moscow. Even when serious problems did arise, it
seemed obvious the Soviets wanted to maintain a relationship
of diminished tension with the West. Yet, the Soviets were
not able to solve all of their problems in the Socialist bloc
itself.
The Sino-Soviet rift had grown in dimension with open dis-
agreement. The Soviets were concerned with Chinese activities
in Africa and were more than a little concerned with the
encouragement to follow more independent lines given by the
Chinese to the East European states. This was particularly
5 8
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true with Romania. The Soviet leadership was occupied with
the problem of the Socialist bloc as well as worsening domestic
affairs.
In November 1962, Khrushchev announced a division of the
Party into industrial and agricultural sections which no one
knew how to make work. Agriculture was doing poorly and the
Soviets were forced to import grain after the poor harvest of
1963. This was particularly embarrassing to Khrushchev who
had "guaranteed" the Soviet people an improvement in their
standard of living. His plans for corn, "virgin lands" and
other expedients were not successful. But his domestic prob-
lem, coupled with his diminishing control of the Socialist
59bloc, led to his resignation in October 1964.
The new team which took over from Khrushchev - Brezhnev
and Kosygin - were in contrast very cautious bureaucrats who
were selected for that reason. The new leaders stressed that
they would determine the future of the Soviet Union. There
even appeared to be a lull in the rift between the Soviets and
Chinese
.
Peking was elated with the departure of Khrushchev.
(Additionally, on the day Khrushchev was removed from office,
the Chinese exploded their first nuclear device.) For a few
short months there was detente in Sino-Soviet relations. How-
ever, the massive intervention in Vietnam by the U.S. in 1965
brought about a new problem between the Communist giants.




Kosygin visited Hanoi early in 1965 and offered military aid
to the North Vietnamese. But, Kosygin also stressed the im-
portance of negotiations at a Geneva conference in order to
solve the Vietnam issue. The Chinese were totally against
negotiation and saw the offer of Soviet aid to Hanoi as an
attempt to maintain Soviet leverage in the area. Peking wanted
Moscow to pressure the U.S. elsewhere - possibly in Germany.
Relations worsened as the Chinese hindered the movement of
Soviet supplies to North Vietnam. The rift between the nations
was active and growing and affected Soviet perception of affairs
across the Asian continent.
The year 1965 presented other problems to the Soviets in
Asia. Soviet reaction to the India-Pakistan clash of 1965 and
the consequences of a coup d'etat by the Indonesian Communists
which saw the strongest communist party in an Asian non-
communist state erased, was dictated almost entirely by the
Sino-Soviet conflict. The Soviets, rather than taking sides,
acted as a mediator between India and Pakistan and therefore
enhanced their standing in both countries. Following the
elimination of the communist party in Indonesia, the Soviets
did virtually nothing. In both events, the Soviets were afraid
that any expansion of communism in those areas would eventually
be to China's advantage. In essence, Russia had a policy of
"containment" of Asian communism.




While the problem of China appeared most urgent, the
Brezhnev-Kosygin team also turned to domestic problems. The
new regime reversed many of Khrushchev's agricultural policies,
In October 1965, new economic reforms were instituted. The
XXIII Party Congress held in 1966 outlined a Five-Year Plan
providing for the first time a higher percentage rise in con-
sumer goods than in producers' goods.
Thus, after two years in power, the Brezhnev-Kosygin team
appeared to be involved in improving domestic affairs and were
deeply concerned with problems in the Socialist bloc, particu-
larly China. During this period they continued to follow the
1964 foreign policy of Khrushchev - mainly that of peaceful
coexistence
.
In summary, the period 1960-1967 saw the Soviet Union move
from the rather brash and sometimes adventurist foreign policy
of Khrushchev in the early 1960 's to a more cautious foreign
policy of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Dr. Vernon Aspaturian
provides an excellent summary of Khrushchev's global strategy.
While Khrushchev transformed the Soviet Union into a
global power, he did it at the expense of weakening Soviet
control in its own sphere, alienating Moscow's strongest
ally, China, overcommitting the power and resources of the
Soviet Union, and increasing the danger of thermonuclear
war by his persistent prodding and probing of weak spots
in the Western world and forcing the United States into
a series of confrontations, in the hope that this would
result in the settlement of outstanding issues on Soviet
terms and force the United States to withdraw from exposed
positions ....
Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia
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Following an act like Nikita Khrushchev, the Brezhnev-
Kosygin team could hardly be anything but cautious in carrying
out a transfer of power.
B. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY
During the late 1950's, Soviet military affairs became a
subject of many discussions and studies in the USSR. Of par-
ticular interest were the problems of military strategy. The
Soviet military leadership was at last acknowledging that the
tactics and strategies of World War II were no longer valid
with the advent of nuclear weapons. It was not until early
1960 that a new strategy was outlined for the Soviet military.
Speaking before the IV Session of the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR on 14 January 1960, Khrushchev outlined his new mil-
itary strategy. He stated that "the general trend is toward
reduction of tension in international relations" and "under
present conditions war is no longer completely inevitable."
These statements were obviously made in light of the events of
1959 - the meeting at Camp David, plans for a Summit conference
in 1960 and his talk of disarmament. The strategy he outlined
in his speech can be summarized as follows:
(I) A future war could only be a total war, without any
restrictions on the use of thermonuclear weapons.
(II) Thanks to the development of rockets, the initial
phase of such a war could no longer resemble that of
previous wars since an aggressor could now strike immed-
iately at the whole territory of the adversary.
Roman Kolkowicz, "The Military," in Interest Groups in
Soviet Politics
, ed. H. Gordon Skilling § Franklyn Griffiths
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 160.
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(Ill) The answer for a country such as the USSR... was
to take advantage of its vast territory to disperse its
strike force and, relying on their dispersal and also on
a well developed antiaircraft defense system, to have at
its disposal a sufficient retaliatory force to annihilate
the aggressors . 64
The impact of the new strategy on traditional conventional
military forces was tremendous. In essence, Khrushchev said
that the Air Force and surface Navy were outdated. Further-
more, future nuclear war made it unnecessary for the USSR to
maintain a large ground force as there would no longer be
battles to defend the nation's borders. Khrushchev believed
that only a limited Army was required and could possibly be
organized using a territorial system. All of these points led
to an announced reduction in military strength from 3.6 million
to 2.4 million men over an eighteen month period, including
250,000 officers. 65
While the conventional force - the Army, the surface Navy
and tactical Air Force - took the brunt of the force reductions,
a new service was born - the Strategic Rocket Forces. Emphasis
was placed on a new strike force based on strategic missiles,
strategic air defense at a submarine fleet equipped with nu-
clear weapons. An obvious conflict developed between the
proponents of the new nuclear strategy and the proponents of
the traditional conventional forces. The military was not
only concerned with the impact on many of its officers as they
64Michael Garder, A History of the Soviet Army
,
(New York





were "cast out into an unfriendly social environment" after
becoming accustomed to the high social status of an officer;
they were also deeply concerned that emphasis on strategic
nuclear forces would adversely affect the mobility and re-
sponsiveness of the Soviet forces.
As a result of changes on the international scene in the
months that followed Khrushchev's announced strategy change,
the urgency in carrying out the changes diminished. The mil-
itary resistance to his new strategy was also reduced as events
brought about reconsideration of Khrushchev's plans. The U-2
incident in May 1960, though it did not apparently change any
force reduction plans, provided the military the first oppor-
tunity to speak out. The U.S. effort in early 1961 to acquire
a balanced military posture by improving its neglected conven-
tional forces did cause Khrushchev's cutbacks to lose momentum.
The Berlin affair later that year led both the U.S. and USSR
to call up reserve forces. By July of 1961 the Soviet leaders
formally suspended the force reduction announced in January
1960. Actually, the Soviet military strength increased as many
routine discharges were delayed. Though more of a political
move, the rejection of the three-year moratorium on nuclear
testing by the Soviets in September 1961 was favored by the
military. While 1962 brought the release of the forces aug-
mented in 1961, it also saw the development of a crisis in
Cuba.
66Kolkowicz, "The Military," pp. 161-162.
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As discussed earlier, the Cuban missile crisis was an
unsuccessful attempt to find a short-cut to nuclear parity for
the Soviets. Militarily, the Soviets became acutely aware of
their inability to project their foreign policy on a global
plan. Additionally, the Soviets were forced to admit through
their action that the U.S. did have strategic superiority and
that the reliance on nuclear armed missiles had not been a
decisive factor in the conduct of the crisis.
In analyzing the impact of the "nuclear missile strategy"
on the military, it appears that there was something of a
compromise with respect to the conventional forces - particu-
larly those stationed in Eastern Europe. While troop reduction
did occur, the cuts were generally in connection with the intro-
duction of new weapons. It was generally second-line units in
the interior military districts of the USSR that were reduced
in size. The most radical reform - and what might be called
the real compromise between Khrushchev and the military - was
the effort to modernize theater forces by stressing greater
battlefield firepower and mobility under nuclear conditions.
In effect, the theater forces were provided with capabilities
for both conventional and nuclear warfare by supplementing
those units with tactical nuclear rockets and missiles with
ranges from about 10 to 300 miles as well as nuclear-armed
tactical aircraft. The idea of "nuclearizing" the theater
forces was opposed by some military leaders as it was believed
that those forces would be poorly prepared to conduct extensive
58

conventional campaigns because of increasing reliance on
nuclear firepower.
In addition to streamlining the theater forces in Eastern
Europe, the Soviets reappraised the capabilities of the East
European armies. Following the Berlin crisis of 1961, the
Soviets began a reinforcement of the Warsaw Pact. In addition
to modernizing and integrating the armies in a joint organiza-
tion, the Soviets began to look at the actual contribution
that could be expected from the East European armies in the
event of war in Europe. By strengthening the cohesion of these
armies, the Soviets were able to bring about a reduction of
69Soviet ground forces in that theater. The question still
remained, however, as to the reliability and responsiveness
of these armies to Soviet direction.
In December of 1963, Khrushchev again called for reduction
in military spending and manpower. This manpower cut was not
only a display of Khrushchev's attitude towards detente, but
also was an effort to find money to bolster the sagging civilian
economy. The military again felt threatened but found that
both domestic and foreign affairs favored their cause. Growing
U.S. involvement in Vietnam (which meant increased U.S. expend-
itures on their military forces) and an increase in Sino-Soviet
tension, which threatened to lead to open conflict, kept the
70discussion of the need for a strong military from fading.
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Khrushchev, however, again began to question the utility
and expense of maintaining "pure" conventional forces such as
tanks which were so vulnerable to anti-tank weapons. In fact,
he abolished the ground forces command in September 1964 as a
separate command and subordinated these forces directly to the
General Staff in the Ministry of Defense, supposedly as an
71
effort to streamline the defense establishment. The Soviet
military hierarchy was extremely unhappy and concerned with
Khrushchev's opinion of the military - particularly with re-
spect to size and composition of the Soviet military establish-
ment.
Segments of the Soviet military establishment (particularly
the critics of Khrushchev's military policy) must have breathed
a sigh of relief when Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964.
"Experts" on the Soviet Union throughout the world speculated
on a change in Soviet foreign policy leading to renewed mili-
tancy. However, there were no dramatic or visible changes in
the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Only a few months after the new
"team" came to power, the Ministry of Defense published a book,
Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs . What was sig-
nificant was that the book had gone to print before Khrushchev's
"departure." Yet, when it was published, with the exception of
the deletion of all reference to Khrushchev, the book provided
clear indication that the revolution in military affairs, and
,72the associated doctrine and strategy, was to continue.
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The military establishment tolerated for a few months the
new regime's statements concerning domestic programs - partic-
ularly agriculture, light industry and the food industry.
Then, the military began to reassert itself by attempting to
show that the world was full of tensions and dangers rather
than one of military detente. High investments in heavy
industry were stressed in order to support a modern army.
Brezhnev and Kosygin eventually chose a middle of the road
policy. By July of 1965, Brezhnev stated that it was necessary
"to strengthen the country's defense capabilities in light of.
the international situations."
The state budget for 1966 even showed a five percent
73increase in defense expenditures over the 1965 budget.
A discussion of the increase or decrease in the percentage
of a budget allocated to defense expenditures does not neces-
sarily give the reader an appreciation for changes in weaponry
and military capabilities. The period 1960 to 1967 was one
both of change in Soviet strategy and in Soviet weaponry that
was to eventually lead to a more versatile and mobile global
power.
Under ' Khrushchev, Soviet military policy was reshaped in
stages. Initially, following his announced changes in military
strategy in 1960, military programs were oriented towards creat
ing offensive and defensive strategic forces to compete with
the U.S. By the end of Khrushchev's regime, military theorists
73




recognized the need for mobile and versatile forces. However,
there was a failure to formulate a doctrine for limited or
"non-nuclear" war due in most respects to Khrushchev's attitude
that limited war in which nuclear powers participatea haa the
danger of escalation to a global nuclear war. He believed
that only small wars of "national-liberation" should receive
indirect Soviet support.
The military aid programs to several "third world" nations
outside the Soviet bloc in the late 1950' s gave the Soviets a
chance to gain experience in military operations, logistics
support and communications. By the mid- 1960 's the Soviets
began to study amphibious landing operations along with devel-
opment of amphibious landing material. The Soviet marine forces,
or naval infantry, -was reactivated in 1964 with much publicity.
Interest in long-range airlift operations was demonstrated by
programs to develop new large transport aircraft such as the
AN-22. Additionally, military writers began to discuss air-




During the Khrushchev years, the Soviets realized a steady
increase in merchant ship tonnage - from 1.5 million dead-weight
tons in 1959 to nearly 6 million at the end of 1964. Militarily,
the maritime program "fostered" under Khrushchev aided the
Soviets in later achieving global capabilities. The merchant
74Thomas W. Wolfe, The Soviet Quest for More Globally Mobile
Military Power




ship programs included development of large-hatch cargo
ships capable of handling military equipment (as demonstrated
during the Cuban missile crisis). However, under Khrushchev
"a commensurate program to provide naval means adequate for
the protection of Soviet sealift in distant oceans was not
realized." The unanswered question was whether a large mer-
chant fleet would eventually require a "blue-water" navy for
protection.
The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime in its first three years
continued to carry out programs relating to mobility of con-
ventional military forces and to Soviet naval forces. With
regard to the latter, the primary emphasis was placed on con-
tinued strengthening of the fleet of 400 submarines deployed
both on strategic missile platforms and for use in interdiction
of seaborne supply lines. The surface force in 1966-1967 con-
sisted of about 20 cruisers, over 100 destroyers and several
hundred fast patrol boats. Although receiving a lower priority,
some of the craft had been fitted with surface-to-surface and
7 f\
antiaircraft missiles.
Although under the new regime, as of 1966 the Soviets
had not apparently begun a massive program of balanced naval
expansion; the Soviet navy did carry out some new activities
of particular note. Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, Soviet sub-
marines regularly carried out patrols in distant oceans.
75
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In 1966, the Soviets announced a round-the-world cruise by
nuclear-powered submarines. The Soviet leaders obviously were
becoming more aware of their capabilities to project their naval
77power.
The Soviets also developed additional capabilities which
were to increase their global status. Airborne and airlift
reinforcement operations were emphasized in connection with
Warsaw Pact exercises. In addition, the increasing amount of
aid given the North Vietnamese has provided experience in
logistic support, training, and technical backup.
While effort was expended by the new regime on improving
conventional global capabilities, it needs to be realized that
these efforts were second to the improvements in the nuclear
forces. After two years in power, it was apparent that Brezhnev
and Kosygin were committed to a substantial buildup of Soviet
strategic forces. The attempt to strengthen and improve the
Soviet strategic posture greatly overshadowed any improvement
in conventional forces. With regard to strategic weaponry,
the Soviets attempted to develop a mix between offensive and
defensive forces. An accelerated program to construct new
ICBM launcher sites was begun. Many of these sites were dis-
persed and hardened compared to the early "soft site" config-
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While attempts to improve the strategic posture greatly-
overshadowed the improvements in conventional forces during
the period 1960-1967, it is worth noting that all of the
military programs viewed together represented a trend. As a
result of growing U.S. emphasis on the doctrine of "flexible
response," Khrushchev's nuclear strategy was slowly being
tempered to include a growing involvement of improved conven-
tional forces. The Soviet Union was moving from a strategic
nuclear power towards becoming a global power capable of
carrying out a political military response at any level of
the spectrum of military force.
65

V. PHASE FOUR - 1967-1977
The fourth and final phase in Soviet affairs to be surveyed
covers the period 1967 to 1977. During this period the Soviet
Union achieved recognition by the United States as an "equal"
super power. Having achieved nuclear parity, the Soviet lead-
ership has been able to function not only from strength, but
also with an assured confidence. In the past ten years, the
Soviet Union has projected both its political and military
power such that they have played important roles in the affairs
of Africa, the Mideast, and Europe. Basically, the Soviets
have followed a foreign policy aimed at achieving a global role
while maintaining an accommodation with the United States.
A. SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES
In 1967 the war in Vietnam continued to affect Soviet
foreign policy, but the danger of a U.S. -Soviet confrontation
over Vietnam appeared to have passed. Soviet aid to the North
Vietnamese - costing the Soviets only a fraction of what the
Americans were forced to spend on the war - was helping to
frustrate the U.S. efforts in that conflict. The Soviets were
aware that heavy U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia reduced
both the U.S. government's ability and the American people's
willingness to become involved in other Soviet activities in
the world.
While the Soviets were concerned with affairs in Asia -
particularly an escalation of the Sino-Soviet dispute - they
66

became involved in new crises - first in the Middle East and
then in Eastern Europe. In the Middle East, the pro-Soviet
regime that had seized power in Syria in 1966 and the Egyptian
government under Nasser were both receiving aid from the USSR.
In June of 1967, after the Israelis defeated Egypt, Jordan and
Syria in the Six Day War, the Soviets could do nothing to
support their clients except sever relations with Israel.
However, the Soviets did go about re-equipping the defeated
Arab nations. Kosygin made a trip to the United States and the
the United Nations during which he unsuccessfully tried to
force Israel to withdraw from territory it occupied during the
war. As the result of the war, however, the Soviets were more
involved than ever in the Middle East and the Soviet- equipped
79Arab states "were driven into deeper dependence on them."
Elsewhere in the Middle East, in November 1967, the USSR
intervened militarily in the Yemeni civil war. This led in
the following year to an agreement on military and technical
O Q
assistance with the new South Yemen government. Meanwhile,
a crisis was developing closer to home.
Problems for the Soviets had been growing in Czechoslovakia
for several months before Alexander Dubcek became First Secre-
tary of the Czechoslovak Party in January 1968. Concerned that
the Dubcek regime was being pushed from "the road to socialism"
- as evidenced by freedom of the press and proclaimed civil
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liberties - the Soviets, with Polish, Hungarian, East German
and Bulgarian support, attempted to use the threat of military-
force to bring the Czechoslovak nation back to the fold. This
failing, Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia
on 20 August 1968. There was little violence, however, and
the Soviets took control of the country. Besides insuring
that Soviet control of the East European bloc remained intact,
the Soviets were able to sign a "treaty" whereby Soviet troops
8
1
would remain indefinitely in that country. (For a detailed
analysis of the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia,
see Section VI .B. /'Czechoslovakia - 1968.")
The Russians described the defense of Czechoslovakia as an
international socialist duty. Brezhnev, late in 1968 put forth
what has become known as the Brezhnev Doctrine to explain the
intervention.
....when internal and external forces, hostile to socialism,
seek to reverse the development of any socialist country
whatsoever in the direction of the restoration of the
capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism
in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist
commonwealth as a whole - this already becomes not only a
problem of the people of the country concerned, but also
a common problem and the concern of all socialist countries. 82
While the USSR put forth its "rules of the game" for the
"Socialist commonwealth," it was not quite so easy to establish
rules for the nuclear power contest that continued to grow
between the world's two superpowers. By 1968, it was obvious








reduce the momentum of the nuclear arms race. In July 1968,
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was signed not only by the
U.S., USSR and Great Britain but eventually also by West Ger-
many, Japan and numerous other states. (China did not sign
and claimed the treaty was proof of Soviet complicity with the
8 3
American "imperialists.") The next logical step for the
superpowers was discussion on disarmament.
President Johnson had proposed as early as 1961 that the
U.S. and USSR should engage in talks which became known as
SALT - Strategic Arms Limitation talks. It was not until mid
1968 that the Soviets accepted the proposal, possibly because
it was not until then that the USSR was within reach of rough
numerical strategic parity. In January 1969, both the U.S.
and USSR expressed readiness to begin talks. (Nixon referred
to a doctrine of /'strategic sufficiency" which in effect re-
nounced the U.S. claim to strategic superiority.)
SALT talks began in Helsinki in November 1969. Of concern
to the superpowers was that three technological developments -
new and more precise guidance systems increasing missile
accuracy, multiple re-entry vehicles (particularly multiple,
independently targetable re-entry vehicles) and anti-ballistic
missile systems - made it conceivable that a first-strike
attack by one of the two powers might be successful. The SALT
talks continued into 1970. (A Soviet-American agreement was
O "7
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signed in October 1969 on banning the emplacement of nuclear
84
weapons on the sea-bed.)
An extremely important treaty of another type was signed
in August 1970. This treaty - the Treaty of Moscow - was
signed between the USSR and West Germany and formed what is
generally a "de facto" European peace settlement. The treaty
was a mutual renunciation of force and the recognition of the
8 5frontiers in Europe existing as a result of World War II.
Thus, Soviet relations on the Western front improved while
there was concern on the other front - with China.
In 1969, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated drastically.
In March, border clashes erupted along the Ussuri River. In
August, there were more clashes along the Sinkiang frontier.
There was speculation in the world that the USSR and China
were moving towards a military showdown. Such a war, however,
would have been against one of the fundamental tenets of the
Marxist-Leninist theory: that war is a product of the capital-
ist order - not to be fought between two socialist states. By
the end of the year, the two sides agreed to try to settle
their differences. The comming months were to show how Un-
ci
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successful those attempts were to be.
The Soviets were again extremely active in the Mideast and
North Africa in 1971. Continuing to supply the Egyptians -
84
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particularly the deployment of a large air defense system of
fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles the year before -
the Soviets increased their influence in the area. By the end
of the year, the Soviets were supplying arms to Lebanon, Syria,
Morocco and Algeria. The Sudanese, however, left the Soviet
8 7
camp and turned towards the Chinese. The Soviets suffered
another defeat when Sadat demanded the withdrawal of all
(almost 17,000 total) Soviet military advisors from Egypt the
8 8following year.
While achieving gains and suffering losses with the Third
World nations, the Soviets continued to reduce the risk of a
confrontation with the U.S. In 1972, two important bilateral
military agreements were concluded with the Americans: the
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
(ABM's) and the interim agreement relating to the limitation
of strategic offensive arms (to last five years) . The ABM
treaty took one extremely expensive weapon system out of the
arms race while the interim agreement was a holding operation
in which a limit was placed on the number of strategic offen-
sive weapons each side could possess - the Soviets being
allowed a numerical superiority in operational ICBM's and
89SLBM's. It was obvious Brezhnev and Kosygin wanted assur-
ances against a nuclear conflict between the two nations.
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The following year, 1973, three additional nuclear agree-
ments were signed. The first agreement - to last ten years -
related to the peaceful use of atomic energy. The second
agreement, a Soviet initiative - and of unlimited duration -
binds the U.S. and USSR "to proceed from the premise that each
party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the
other party, against the allies of the other party, and against
other countries, in circumstances which may endanger interna-
tional peace and security." The third agreement committed the
two governments to undertake serious efforts toward reaching a
permanent limitation on strategic offensive arms agreement with
90the possibility of signing such a treaty in 1974.
The relationship between the two superpowers was tested
only a few months later when war again broke out in the Middle
East between Israel and the Arabs. While the war lasted only
from the sixth to the twenty-fifth of October, both the U.S.
and USSR became deeply involved. However, while each of the
two powers resupplied their respective allies through impres-
sive airlift operations, they also conferred with each other.
Additionally, both powers supported resolutions in the United
91Nations to bring about a ceasefire. With a ceasefire came
a reduction in tension among all parties involved. And, it
would appear the U.S. -USSR relations had not suffered greatly.
The following summer - 1974 - during President Nixon's







the Soviets and Americans. These treaties included the Treaty
of 3 July banning the underground testing of nuclear weapons
with a yield in excess of 150 kilotons; the Protocol to the
1972 ABM treaty in which both sides agreed to limit ABM de-
ployment to almost half of what was allowed by the 1972 treaty;
an agreement to begin negotiations on environmental warfare;
and an agreement to work toward a limitation on strategic arms
agreement covering the period until 1985. Also, the two
governments agreed to consider a joint initiative regarding
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chemical warfare. These results of Soviet foreign policy
would seem to indicate that the USSR was achieving all of its
goals.
While the Soviets had what appeared to be an active and
successful foreign policy, the USSR was suffering economic
problems. The Soviets admitted in 1969 that the key problem
was to increase productivity. They needed new methods to re-
place the quantitative approach to their economy. In addition,
they had to look beyond their own borders for assistance.
During the early 1970' s, Soviet trade with several countries
throughout the world increased substantially. In 1972, they
signed a three-year grain agreement with the U.S. This was
followed by a five-year agreement with a U.S. oil company for
the joint development of Soviet oil and natural gas. Soviet
trade also increased sharply with Japan as the two countries






in Siberia. In 1973, a ten-year economic agreement was signed
with West Germany involving the development of economic, indus-
trial and technological cooperation between the U.S. and USSR
was signed in 1974.
Though it would seem that U.S. -Soviet relations were con-
stantly improving, there was actually a stagnation of detente
and a cooling of relations in 1975 and 1976. There were various
indicators of the trend: the deadlock in SALT talks, the post-
ponement of Brezhnev's trip to the U.S., the Soviet cancella-
tion of the U.S. -Soviet trade agreement (January 1975), and
U.S. reactions to Soviet affairs in Africa.
Soviet foreign policy in Africa has become a sore point
with the West in the past two to three years. The Soviets
actually began a more vigorous program in Africa in about 1972.
Worried over Chinese successes on that continent, the Soviets
expanded their own operation.
The greatest increase in Soviet activity in Africa came
following the collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974.
Angola, one of Portugal's African colonies, was immersed in a
three-way fight for political and military power involving
three competing insurgent movements. The Soviets provided
military support to one of the factions - the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) . By early 1975, the Soviets
were sending substantial military supplies to the MPLA and later
in the year the Soviets introduced Cuban "advisors" into the
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country. The result of the Soviet effort in Angola was an
93Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in
Southern Africa," Foreign Affairs




awareness in the West of the obvious improvements in Soviet
global military capability, particularly the growth of Soviet
conventional power. The spectre of "the Soviet threat" had
been revived. (For a detailed analysis of the Soviet military
involvement in Angola, see Section VI . C. "Angola - 1974-1976".)
In summarizing the ten years of Soviet foreign policy from
1967 to 1977, one point stands out - the Soviet awareness of
the importance of the West to affairs in the Soviet Union.
Once the Soviets achieved some semblance of nuclear parity, it
was to their advantage to agree to limiting the nuclear arms
race. Military spending was taking a large portion of their
budget during a period in which the economy was suffering set-
backs. With the threat of nuclear war reduced, the Soviets
more easily accepted the fact that they needed Western tech-
nology and "know how" to bolster their economy. Agricultural
setbacks forced them to turn to the West for supplies of grain
While they presented a good appearance in the spotlight on the
center of the stage, they nevertheless were increasing their
efforts in the wings - with Third World nations. It is the
Soviet affairs in the "wings" that have the West questioning
Soviet intentions.
B. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY
The decade 1967-1977 saw the USSR achieve nuclear parity
(and more) with the U.S. while expanding their conventional
military forces. While it is understandable that the Soviets
would strive to achieve at least parity in strategic nuclear
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capabilities, their goals with respect to improvements and
increases in conventional military forces are not as easily
explained. In response to the West's strategy of "flexible
response," the Soviets modified their doctrine based solely
on nuclear weaponry to include the requirement for their
armed forces to have the capability to fight with or without
nuclear weapons. The ground forces were reinstated as a
separate command early in this phase. However, improvements
in tactical fighting aircraft, strategic airlift, reconnais-
sance, and their "blue water" navy have been of the kind
generally designed for force projection and employment beyond
a nation's borders. All of the improvements of these conven-
tional forces have been carried out without apparently jeopar-
dizing the continued improvement of nuclear strategic forces
which retain top priority in Soviet strategy.
The decade 1967-1977 saw the actual deployment of Soviet
conventional force more than any time since the end of World
War II. It involved not only deployment of forces to Eastern
Europe and the Soviet borders with China, but also the deploy-
ment of advisors, technicians and military hardware to non-bloc
countries. Brezhnev and Kosygin continued the policy of re-
equipping and modernizing the forces in the Warsaw Pact - both
Soviet forces and the individual national forces - primarily
those of Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany - with both
conventional forces and tactical nuclear missiles. Maneuvers
testing those forces became more frequent than during the
Khrushchev years. On the opposite front, the Soviets became
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more and more fearful of trouble with China. In 1968 it was
estimated that there were fifteen Soviet divisions along the
Chinese border and in Mongolia. However, after several border
incidents, by late 1971 the number of Soviet divisions along
the same frontier was estimated to have increased to forty-four
94
- more Soviet divisions than in Eastern Europe.
Other than border skirmishes, the Soviets have deployed
combat forces twice since 1967. As mentioned earlier, they
intervened militarily in the civil war in Yemen in late 1967.
However, the military intervention in Czechoslovakia by the
Soviets and military units of the Warsaw Pact was not only of
a more serious nature but also was carried out on a far greater
scale. The West - which "stood back and did nothing" - was
treated to a display of Soviet military capability that had
not been seen before. For the Soviets, it was like conducting
a final exam following extensive maneuvers in and around Czecho
Slovakia. For the first time the Soviets displayed an airlift
capability of modest, but growing proportions. Also, the
experience in logistical support for such an operation was
invaluable to the Soviets.
The Soviets gained military experience - and prestige - in
other ways, however. As mentioned earlier, they became very
involved in both the Middle East and Africa, providing military
weapons, supplies, and in many cases, military advisors to
Third World nations. While the policy of supplying arms to





such countries has primarily been for political purposes,
there have been economic gains also. By 1971-1972, the USSR
surpassed the U.S. in supplies of major weapons to other
countries. During 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the West was pro-
vided an impressive display of the capabilities of Soviet
weaponry which had been supplied to the Arab nations. The
West began to take a second look at the supply of Soviet arms
throughout Africa. The Khadafy regime in Libya and the Amin
government in Uganda, both nations possessing questionable
motives, began receiving Soviet arms. However, the Soviet
support of the MPLA in Angola registered the greatest response
from the West. If nothing else, the West realized for the
first time the global capabilities that the Soviets possessed.
A chronological discussion of the development of the Soviet
conventional forces over the past ten years is not as important
as a review of what has actually been accomplished by the USSR
in expanding their global conventional capabilities to meet
their foreign policy commitments in the past decade. As the
late Marshal A. A. Grechko stated in February 1974:
....The Soviet Armed Forces are continuing persistently
to achieve military mastery and they are maintaining
constant readiness to repel any aggression no matter
from where and from whom it comes. 95
In May 1974, Grechko was quoted in another article:
At the present stage the historic function of the
Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted merely by their
function in defending our Motherland and the other
?5William F. Scott, "The USSR's Growing Global Mobility,"
Air Force Magazine
, March 1977, p. 57.
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socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity the
Soviet state actively purposely opposes the export of
counter-revolution and the policy of oppression, supports
the national-liberation struggle, and resolutely resists
imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our
planet it may appear. 96
With these important statements in mind, a "scorecard"
will be presented to provide the reader an appreciation of
the growth in Soviet conventional forces and global capabil-
ities .
The Soviet ground forces have been expanded and strength-
ened by a substantial increase in the number of tanks, tactical
missiles and artillery pieces in the past few years. The
ground forces have increased by 800,000 men since 1965, with
an increase in total active divisions from 148 to 170 in the
same time-frame. Some of the increase came about because of
the buildup on the Sino-Soviet border. After the Czechoslovak
affair in 1968, Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe increased
from 22 to 27. Authorized strengths of tank and motorized
rifle divisions increased by 500 to 1,000 men per division.
The number of main battle tanks per division has increased
considerably. The introduction of the modern T-72 tank began
in 1976 and by the end of that year over 2,000 had been pro-
duced. Additionally, the ground forces have been equipped
with the innovative BMP infantry vehicle, new 122mm and 152mm
self-propelled howitzers, and several new divisional surface-
to-air missiles (both vehicle mounted and portable) . Tactical





the new short-range missiles. Of particular note is the
stress the Soviets have put on tactical bridging capability.
Considerable resources have been devoted to river-crossing
equipment. Additionally, a river-crossing capability is built
98into most Soviet combat vehicles.
The Soviet naval forces have also undergone major growth
and improvement in the past ten years. Between 1967 and 1973,
the USSR introduced nearly a dozen major new classes of warships,
including the missile-armed MOSKVA and LENINGRAD helicopter
carriers, guided missile cruisers, a multi-missile cruiser and
two new classes of ballistic missile submarines (YANKEE and
DELTA). As a result, the number of major Soviet warships afloat
(221) exceeded that of the U.S. (174) for the first time in
history. In late 1973 the first Soviet aircraft carrier (KIEV)
was launched. The KIEV will carry both helicopters and a new
V/STOL (vertical and short- takeoff and landing) aircraft, the
99Yak-36 (FORGER). The Soviets most certainly were acquiring
the capability to fight a naval action.
Admiral Gorshkov, in his book, The Sea Power and the State
,
published in 1976, expanded on the basic idea that a navy must
be capable of fighting naval actions at sea.
97General George S. Brown, USAF , Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1978
,
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99Michael T. Klare, "Superpower Rivalry at Sea," Foreign
Policy
,
Winter 1975-76, p. 88.
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Demonstrative actions of the fleet in many cases make
it possible to achieve political goals without resorting
to armed conflict by just indicating pressure by their
potential might and the threat of beginning military
actions ....
Moreover, the neutral waters of the world's oceans
permit accomplishing the transfer and concentration of
forces of the fleet without giving the opposing side
formal ground for protests or other forms of counter-
action. 100
Since the mid 1960's the USSR has kept a significant por-
tion of its Black Sea fleet in the Mediterranean (anywhere
from 50 to 90 vessels). Additionally, the Soviets have in-
creased the visits by their warships to ports of other countries
This has been particularly true in the Indian Ocean. However,
although the Soviets have naval-basing facilities at a few
friendly Third World ports like Conakry in Guinea and Cienfuegos
in Cuba, nowhere does it have access to foreign full-service
*. ii +. 101installations
.
The Soviets have demonstrated the capabilities of their
naval forces in two large exercises. In April and May 1970,
the USSR conducted its first global naval exercises - the OKEAN
maneuvers. OKEAN II in April 1975 was larger and more impres-
sive as the Soviets demonstrated their ability to carry out
102
sustained naval operations far from the Soviet land mass.
The question remains, of course, whether the OKEAN maneuvers
are indicative of how the Soviets plan to employ their naval
forces in the future.
100 Scott, "The USSR's Growing Global Mobility," p. 58.





The Soviet Air Force consists of three major components:
Frontal Aviation, Military Transport Aviation and Long Range
Aviation. Long Range Aviation consists of bomber aircraft
whose mission it would be during wartime to strike deep in the
enemy's rear. The most recent addition to Long Range Aviation
is the supersonic BACKFIRE bomber. The aircraft has become an
issue in the SALT negotiations as to whether it is an inter-
continental bomber or not. The most impressive improvements,
however, have taken place in the other two components of the
Air Force.
Since the late 1960's the Soviets' Frontal Aviation
(tactical aviation) forces have increased in both numbers and
quality. Traditionally, the Soviets have emphasized air defense
in their tactical air force. However, since the mid 1960's the
Soviets have worked at providing the tactical air force with an
improved ground attack capability. New fighter aircraft ap-
peared with improved payload and range for more effective,
offensive roles. In 1973, a new generation of fighter aircraft
became operational - the SU-17, MIG-23 and SU-19 - possessing
even greater range, payload, avionics and electronic counter-
measure capabilities which provided the Soviets a multiple
mission potential. With these new aircraft, the Soviets are
capable of striking targets in most of the NATO countries. To
complement the new multi-mission tactical aircraft, the Soviets
have introduced improved air-to-air and tactical air-to-surface
missiles. The reconnaissance capability of the tactical air
force has been substantially improved with the introduction of
the Mach 2.8 MIG- 25/FOXBAT B.
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Since 1973, the Soviets have been deploying the third-
generation tactical aircraft into their units in Eastern
Europe. All of the new Soviet fighters are believed to have
an air-to-ground nuclear capability. In addition, the Soviets
have been upgrading the tactical air units of the Warsaw Pact
103
nations.
The airlift capability of Military Transport Aviation has
also been improving. Its capability to move cargo to a range
of 2,000 nautical miles has increased by fifty percent in the
past ten years. While many of the transports are old, the
Soviets have introduced new jet transports such as the IL-76.
It can airdrop up to three airborne assault vehicles at a range
of 3,100 miles. Another new aircraft, the IL-86, capable of
carrying up to 350 passengers, flew in December 1976. Together,
the IL-76 and IL-86 could eventually provide the Soviets with
a global air mobility capability.
The airlift capability of the USSR cannot be measured by
the Military Transport Aviation alone. The transport aircraft
of the Soviet airline, Aeroflot, are available to support mil-
itary airlift requirements. For example, in 1976, Cuban troops
were airlifted to Angola in Aeroflot IL-62's. Rotation of
military personnel to East Germany is carried out each six
months by Aeroflot transports. These tasks have been accom-
plished with no disruption of normal airline schedules. It is
estimated that up to 1,200 Aeroflot transports could be diverted
104
to military use.
103 Brown, Military Posture
, pp. 77-79.




While Soviet improvements in conventional forces have been
impressive, it is important to remember that there have been
just as dramatic improvements in Soviet strategic forces since
1967. Quantitatively, there has of course been the increase
in Soviet ICBM's from 224 to about 1600. Sea-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBM's) have increased from 29 to 730 or more. Stra-
tegic warheads and bombs will have increased greatly due to the
introduction of MIRV-ed systems. Qualitatively, four new
models of ICBM's and a new generation of ballistic missile
submarines have been deployed. In addition, the Soviets have
improved the accuracy of their ICBM's. As mentioned earlier,
the BACKFIRE bomber has been deployed. 105
U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General David C. Jones
expressed dismay at the increased military efforts being
carried out by the Soviets during a period of supposedly
reduced tensions.
Soviet defense expenditures are the highest in post
World War II history, and they continue to sustain a
substantial real growth rate. If this priority on mil-
itary spending were fueled by a serious external threat
to Soviet security interests vis-a-vis the U.S., the
rapid growth of Soviet forces might be viewed with some
equanimity. However, the direction and momentum of
Soviet spending are far out of proportion to any ra-
tional perception of threat or equilibrium. Not since
Germany's rearmament in the 1930 's has the world witnessed
such a single-minded emphasis on military expansion by a
major power. 1""
106 t t . j c nIbid.
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Figure 1. Data taken from General George S. BrownChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff






Presented thus far has been a historical survey of four
phases in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces since
World War II. The growth of conventional military forces and
the relationship of these forces to an expanding nuclear strat-
egy in Soviet foreign and domestic policy has been presented.
To provide a better understanding of the Soviet use of and
attitude towards conventional military force during this period,
three case studies of use of Soviet conventional forces will
be analyzed in detail: Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968;
and Angola, 1975-1976. Each incident involved the deployment
of conventional forces - either conventionally armed or con-
ventional weapons for use by non-Russian troops - to achieve
foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union. However, the decision
to deploy the forces and the forces available in each incident
were different. Three factors will be reviewed in each inter-
vention: (1) the Soviet goals and objectives; (2) the Soviet
military force available; and (3) the reaction by both the
target country and the West - mainly the U.S.
A. HUNGARY - 1956
1. Background
It might be said the seeds for the 1956 Hungarian
Revolution were actually planted after the death of Stalin.
Fearing riots in Hungary similar to those in Pilsen, Czecho-
slovakia on 1 June and in East Berlin on 16 and 17 June 1953,
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the Soviets moved to liberalize affairs in Hungary. Imre Nagy
was appointed head of the Hungarian government and he announced
107
a major program of reform - the "new Course."
In early 1955, Navy was linked with Georgi Malenkov, the
deposed Soviet Politboro member, and was expelled from the
Party. He was re-replaced by M. Rakosi but the "New Course"
was to haunt the Rakosi regime. After Khrushchev's denuncia-
tion of Stalin in February of 1956, the Hungarians followed
the example and renounced Rakosi. By July, the Hungarian
Central Committee no longer supported Rakosi and the Russians
intervened to force his resignation and replaced him with Erno
r
" 108Gero.
The Hungarians were generally not satisfied with the
ti ti
appointment of Gero. Gero had the support of the secret police
(AVH) , the army and the Soviet military forces stationed in
Hungary. However, Imre Nagy was still admired and the Nagy
faction had both popular and segments of Party support. In




By September of 1956, the Hungarian students took the lead
in demanding reforms. By the end of the month, students had
107
D. M. Condit et al , Challenge and Response in Internal
Conflict
,
3 Vols., The American University Center for Research
in Social Systems (Washington, D.C.: Social Science Research
Institute, 1967), Vol. II: "Hungary," The Experience in Europe
and the Middle East
, by Leonard Bushkoff, pp. 533- 535.
108William H. Fraser, ''Comparison of Soviet-Satellite Rela-
tions During the Polish October 1956, The Hungarian Revolution
1956, the Czecho-Slovak Intervention 1968," Monograph on Security





formed new organizations that were separate from communist
youth organizations. In October, Wladyslaw Gomulka came into
power in Poland without Soviet military intervention to pre-
vent his National Communists from taking over. This, together
with other factors , sparked tensions and emotions in Hungary.
Students met in Budapest on 22 October to display support for
the Poles and adopted a list of sixteen demands. The demands
included withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, the return
of the government to Nagy, free elections and freedom of speech.
Plans were made for a public demonstration the following day.
The 23 October rally, unbeknownst to the students, was to
blossom into a revolution.
The Hungarian Revolution actually involved two separate
interventions by Soviet military forces. The first interven-
tion involved only those Soviet troops stationed in Hungary,
while the second intervention involved Soviet units from the
USSR and Romania. The first use of Soviet .military force came
about in the early hours of 24 October as Soviet troops entered
Budapest. The force was composed of about ten battalions of
tank and reconnaissance troops. It is estimated the total
force included no more than 6,000 men. The Soviets insisted
the troops were responding to a request for assistance from the
Hungarian government.
110Condit, "Hungary," pp. 576-577.
John Gellner, "The Hungarian Revolution: A Military
Post-Mortem," Marine Corps Gazette , April 1958, p. 56.
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It has never been definitely determined who asked the
Soviets to intervene militarily. There has always been a
question as to when a request would have been made, or if a
request was made at all. If one considers an elementary prob-
lem of time and distance, the Soviets must have been moving
toward Budapest late on 23 October before any rioting actually
began. A changing Hungarian political situation (Nagy once
again became Prime Minister in the early hours of 24 October)
added to the confusion. The fact remains that Soviet troops
112did enter Budapest.
For four days Soviet tanks engaged in intermittent
fighting with Hungarians in various areas of Budapest. How-
ever, the Soviet military refrained from making any real
113
assaults against the insurgents. The fighting did not
follow any pattern of established military tactics, although
there was gunfire virtually everywhere with large scale damage.
The Hungarian Army had fallen apart soon after fighting broke
out, and many sided with the insurgents. Soviet tanks and
armored cars raced up and down the streets looking for a
114
revolutionary army that did not exist.
On 27 October, a new Hungarian government was formed
with Nagy as Prime Minister and Janos Kadar as Party Secretary.
112 Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary
,
(Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 276.
113Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1962), p. 256.
114 Leslie B. Bain, The Reluctant Satellites (New York: The
MacMillan Co., 1960), p. 112.
89

The government was to include several non- communist members.
It abolished the AVH as one of its first priorities. The new
government announced that the Soviets had agreed to withdraw
their forces from Budapest. Thus, the first intervention by
Soviet troops ended without restoration of order or annihilation
of the Hungarian revolutionaries. Instead, the resistance was
strengthened and had produced a genuine revolution.
It was announced that withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Budapest would begin 28 October. However, on the evening of
31 October, reports reached Nagy from eastern Hungary of a
substantial Soviet troop buildup. On 1 November, Nagy advised
Soviet Ambassador Yuri Andropov that because of a buildup of
Soviet troops reported in Hungary, Hungary was withdrawing
from the Warsaw Pact. Additionally, Hungary's neutrality was
declared. By late afternoon, Nagy had communicated with the
United Nations requesting the four Great Powers defend Hungary's
neutrality.
Andropov suggested that troops entering Hungary were
only a relief for Soviet troops that had been fighting. He
further suggested that talks be carried out with Soviet mili-
tary representatives to discuss the necessary details for troop
withdrawal. However, on the night of 3 November, the Hungarian
military delegation involved in the talks was arrested and at
about 0300 hours the next morning, 4 November, the Russians
began a second armed intervention in Hungary. Attacking in





strength, the Soviets gained all major objectives by 0800
hours. Using massive superiority in numbers and firepower,
the Soviets obviously wanted to suppress all resistance quickly
and absolutely.
2. Soviet Goals and Objectives
In 1953, the Soviets used troops in East Berlin to
suppress an uprising by East German workers demonstrating
against economic policies in that country. In October of 1956,
the Soviets apparently initially perceived the student unrest
in Hungary as an uprising of demonstrators similar to that in
East Berlin which could be put down with Soviet troops stationed
in the country. The Kremlin leaders did not realize they were
witnessing a national revolution and an uprising even supported
by the segments of the Communist Party elite of Hungary.
Unlike East Berlin in 1953, the Soviets encountered unexpected
resistance when Soviet units entered Budapest early on 24 Oct.
The intervention was indecisive as the Soviet military com-
manders in Hungary apparently had no specific guidance or
directives to deal with the situation they encountered. The
reasons for that include not only Soviet concern for the im-
mediate affairs in Hungary, but also concern for broad foreign
and domestic policy goals and objectives. These other concerns
could and would be influenced by whatever action was ultimately
taken in Hungary.
Gellner, "The Hungarian Revolution," p. 10.
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Earlier in October, the Soviet Politboro had shown
grave concern over political affairs in Poland. The Poles
had basically wanted to determine their own domestic policies
and put in their "own man," Gomulka, as head of the Party.
The Soviets were concerned with the possibility of a trend
spreading across Eastern Europe with a resultant loss of con-
trol by the Soviets over the individual communist parties.
Indirect pressure and threats were used to convince the Poles
of their "mistake." Yet, after Khrushchev and three other
important Soviet leaders visited Poland on 19 October, the
Poles were allowed to carry on with their plans for national
communism. Apparently Khrushchev was assured that the Polish
leaders were in complete control and Poland was neither to
withdraw from the Warsaw Pact nor to establish a pluralistic
117
regime. That was the situation in Eastern Europe as the
Hungarian unrest exploded.
Soviet control of Eastern Europe was at a crossroads.
The Soviet Politboro met in full session in an attempt to find
a solution to the problems in the socialist bloc. Not only did
Hungary form an important geographic link in the Warsaw Treaty
Organization, but the loss of Hungary from the socialist bloc
would have been a setback to the Russians' hopes of preserving
the monolith of world socialism. The Soviets were appraised
of. growing unrest in other East European countries: Romanian
117 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and
Conflict
,





and Czechoslovak leaders sent worried messages to Moscow warn-
ing of imminent uprisings by the Hungarian minorities in their
countries, while East German leader Walter Ulbricht warned of
possible outbreaks similar to the 1953 uprisings. If problems
were not bad enough, the Chinese Communists irritated Khrush-
chev by giving him advice. Mao Tse Tung sent a message asking
the Soviet Politboro for quick action "to smash the counter-
118
revolutionary rebellion in Hungary." Yugoslavia's Tito
termed events in Hungary as essentially an anti-Stalinist
reaction and said intervention against the Hungarians would
harm Soviet interests elsewhere. Thus, the Soviet leaders had
to debate the question: Is the Hungarian counter-revolution
directed against communism and the Soviet Union, or is it
119basically akin to the recent changeover in Poland?
The Soviets had to consider what the effects would be
if they were to carry out a large scale intervention after it
was obvious the initial intervention was a failure. In their
book, Political Power: USA/USSR
,
Brzezinski and Huntington
relate the Soviet situation as follows:
...an armed intervention would be certain to provide much
resentment in Eastern Europe and could perhaps set off a
new explosion in Poland; it would certainly worsen Soviet
relations with Tito, only very recently and with much dif-
ficulty improved; it would be an implied admission that
the pace of de-Stalinization had been too rapid, and this
in turn would certainly affect the prestige and power of
Khrushchev; finally, it could even precipitate a clash with
the United States.... On the other hand, non-intervention
118Janos Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956
Revolution and Realpolitik (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution
Press, 1972), p. 12.




might result in the spreading of the revolt to the
neighboring communist countries and endanger the entire
structure of Soviet power in the region; it would be a
sign of Soviet impotence .... domestically , in the Soviet
Union, revisionist tendencies might be encouraged.... *^0
While the Politboro debated the effects of possible
intervention, Mikoyan and Suslov were sent to Budapest on 30
October to view Hungarian affairs first hand. They found the
Hungarian Communist Party had almost completely collapsed.
They also found the Hungarians had formed a coalition govern-
ment with a multi-party system. Mikoyan and Suslov warned the
new government it must not allow the return of the old prewar
capitalist regime nor could it become an anti-Soviet base.
On the very day Mikoyan and Suslov left Moscow for
Budapest, the USSR issued a declaration concerning "developing
and further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between
the Soviet Union and -other socialist states." Besides being
a form of subtle pressure on the Hungarians, it was also
intended to make the Western powers believe the Soviets had
121honorable intentions with respect to Hungary.
Unfortunately, the Hungarians did not get the impres-
sion the Soviets had honorable intentions. When Soviet military
units continued to move into Hungary on 1 November, Nagy sum-
moned Andropov to his office and announced Hungary's neutrality
and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. That must have been the
point where a definite decision had to be made by the
120
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Soviet Politboro. The Hungarians had taken the most drastic
actions in the eyes of the Russians and only a strong and
rapid intervention by the Russians could end the entire affair.
3. Soviet Military Forces Available
The Soviet military forces in Hungary in early October
of 1956 consisted of two divisions: the 2nd and 17th Mechanized
Divisions. The two divisions consisted of about twenty thousand
men and six hundred tanks and armored cars. The Soviets did
not have enough men and equipment to control the country but
were used instead to support the Hungarian communist govern-
ment as an absolutely reliable military force. (The Hungarian
armed forces were considered of questionable value if they were
needed to quell internal disorder.) The 2nd Mechanized Divi-
sion was stationed at Cegled, 51 miles southeast of Budapest,
while the 17th Mechanized Division was stationed at Szekesfe-
12 2hervar, 41 miles southwest of Budapest.
There is evidence to indicate the Soviets were making
plans to use military force in Hungary even before the events
of 23 October. On 20 and 21 October, floating bridges were
assembled on the Hungarian-Soviet frontier. Soviet military
units in Romania recalled their officers from leave and Hun-
garian-speaking reserve officers were called to duty. Soviet
forces in western Hungary were seen moving in the direction of
123
Budapest.
122Gellner, "The Hungarian Revolution," p. 53.
123
"The Report on Hungary," p. 7.
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The Soviet forces readily available prior to the first
intervention included approximately four divisions in addition
to the two divisions stationed in Hungary. They consisted of
two divisions in western Romania (the 32nd and 34th Mechanized
Divisions) and two divisions in the southwestern corner of the
Soviet Ukraine. All of these units were capable of moving
into Hungary if the need arose.
On 27 October, elements of the 32nd and 34th Divisions
from Romania passed through Budapest on a planned move to
western Hungary. Some observers believed the Soviets were
carrying out a new offensive as part of their initial inter-
vention. However, the units entered Budapest only to cross
the Danube River on the best available bridges. Movement of
1 25those units were obviously part of a proposed plan.
Additional forces entered Hungary on 31 October. The
Soviet troops occupied Hungarian airfields on 1 and 2 November
which virtually wliminated future activity by the Hungarian
Air Force. The intervention carried out on 4 November in-
volved about eleven Soviet divisions - nine infantry and two
mechanized divisions. There was also part of a Tactical Air
Army supporting the operation. In all, there were about 120,000
127
men with about 2,500 armored vehicles.
124Gellner, "The Hungarian Revolution," p. 54. \
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In summary, the Soviet forces available in Hungary
increased in size and strength throughout the entire period
of activity from late October through the second intervention
on 4 November. The Soviet leaders used a strong armored force
to guarantee success in their second effort. There were to be
no mistakes the second time.
4 . The Risks of Intervention - Soviet Perceptions of
of Hungarian and U.S. Response
a. Hungarian Response
The Soviet Union was well aware of the capabilities
of the Hungarian military forces. In October of 1956, the
Hungarian armed forces were in the midst of a major reorgan-
ization. Hungary had ten fully organized divisions which
included two mechanized divisions and one in the final stages
of conversion to a mechanized unit. There were two complete
air divisions with a third being formed. Independent units
included heavy artillery and antiaircraft brigades and a horse
cavalry brigade. An airborne division was at about brigade
strength. Total manpower in the Hungarian units was about
250,000 men. Nevertheless, there were some serious weaknesses,
particularly in leadership. A recent "troop reduction" had
been used to get rid of almost 10,000 junior commanders who
had questionable loyalty to the communist regime. That created
a shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers in all
units. 128
Ibid.
, p . 55.
97

The Hungarian Secret Police (AVH) were an important
element in Hungary's domestic affairs. Ten thousand AVH men
were stationed in Budapest while an additional 20,000- 30,000
men were stationed in the provinces. The fact that the AVH
was armed made them an important element to consider in any
potential outbursts by demonstrators. Generally speaking, the
129Soviet military could count on the support of AVH forces.
During the initial disturbance in Budapest on 23
and 24 October, it was the AVH that remained loyal to the pro-
Soviet wing of the Party. Hungarian army units, responding to
requests by government officials to quell the disturbances,
generally sided with the demonstrators. The Hungarian Army
seemed to melt into the crowds, leaving bands of Freedom
Fighters to carry on the harassment of the Soviet troops enter-
ing Budapest. When the Hungarians reorganized their government
on 28 October, it was realized that control of the army had to
be regained. It was decided to combine regular army and police
units with various insurgent armed groups into a national
guard. It was to prove a military error as the national
guard lacked the leadership and cohesiveness required of a
military organization. It was no match for the Soviet force
that entered Budapest on 4 November.
The Soviets established their military presence in
Hungary four days before the 4 November intervention. By gaining
129Condit, "Hungary," p. 58.
Peter I. Gosztony, "General Maleter: A Memoir,"
Problems in Communism
, March-April 1966, p. 58.
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control of airfields and strategic locations, they were able
to minimize, if not eliminate, any organized Hungarian military
response. While the Soviets could guarantee the military
aspects of the intervention, they were not so sure of what
the reactions of the Western world would be.
b. The Soviet Perception of U.S. Response
The Soviet perception of the U.S. response to
affairs in Eastern Europe actually began to develop during the
events in Poland in early October. While there was a general
fear that the Soviets might intervene militarily in Poland,
there were some people who felt the U.S. might show some sup-
port for the Poles. However, Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles appeared on television's "Face the Nation" on 21 October
and indicated two important U.S. policy points: the U.S. did
not intend to intervene and there would be no need for inter-
vention.
There were certain key questions and associated
answers that were applicable to anywhere in Eastern Europe -
even in Hungary later in the month.
Question: "In the event of a blood bath against the Polish
people, what will the United States do?"
Dulles: "....There could be some repression, but when you
have a wholepeople rising up, it's unlikely, I think,
that efforts'will be made to put it down by mass military
measures. I don't think it would succeed."
"...our contribution. .. isn' t one of actually intervening
and meddling, because that kind of thing, that interfer-
ence from abroad in the affairs of another country, often
is counterproductive."
Question: "...is it realistic to suggest that some country




Dulles: " . . . . I doubt whether this would be accepted as
holding a general threat to world peace, or as a threat
which might begin a world war."
Question: "...there were some reports ... about the possible
movements of Russian troops ... from other bordering areas
into Poland. .. .would that not be aggression?"
Dulles: "Well, you see, you have got the so-called Warsaw
Pact which was pretty much imposed by the Kremlin upon
those countries, but in form, it is a mutual security pact
and under it these countries gave the Soviets the right to
have troops within their country. .. .Technically , they per-
haps have the legal right to do that under the Warsaw Pact."
Question: "So that if the Russian troops moved in, you
would not feel that there was any cause for immediate
alarm?"
Dulles: "Well, that's another matter. It is not a matter
which perhaps could be challenged as a violation of inter-
national law because they have a treaty which purports , at
least, to give them the right. It would be a very serious
affair if it happened, and it would certainly be one which
we would watch very closely .... But , from the standpoint of
international law, and violation of treaties , I do not think
you could claim it would be a violation of a treaty."
Question: "....the people of East Germany rose against the
Communist regime and the Russians were able to ... suppress
the uprising by means of armed force. .. .Would we sit back
again... if that kind of an uprising were to take place in
Poland?"
Dulles: "Well, I do not think we would send our Armed
Forces into Poland, or into East Germany, under those
circumstances; I doubt if it would be a profitable or
desirable thing to do. It would be the last thing in
the world that these people, who are trying to win their
independence, would want. That would precipitate a full-
scale war, and the probable results of that would be all
these people would be wiped out." l^ 1
The Soviet leaders probably substituted the word "Hungarian"
every time they heard the word "Pole" in the Dulles interview.
131.
"Robert L. Branyan and Lawrence H. Larsen, The Eisenhower
Administration 1953-1961: A Documentary History , 2 Vols. (New
York: Random House, Inc., 1971), pp. 1: 665-669.
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Dulles' comments set the tone for future U.S. attitudes with
respect to Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, the Soviets were concerned about a
U.S. response to a military intervention in Hungary. For
several months they had heard the Eisenhower administration
discuss the policy of "rolling back the iron curtain." Al-
though it is reported that Khrushchev did not consider the
earlier often-stated Dulles plan of assisting East European
resistance movements as a real threat, he did take the U.S.
nuclear deterrent seriously. Khrushchev reportedly always
felt it necessary to explain to the Soviet leadership that the
effect of their decision must be weighed against the U.S. nu-
clear capability. However, President Eisenhower was just as
concerned with the possibility that the Soviets would resort
132
to extreme measures to ensure their control in Eastern Europe.
On 26 October, Eisenhower asked his National Security Council
for a position paper which emphasized that the Soviets had to
be reassured the U.S. would not attempt to make Hungary a
133
military ally.
The U.S. intentions were communicated to the
Russians on three separate occasions. On 27 October, Dulles
addressed the Council on World Affairs and said of Eastern
132
In his memoirs, President Eisenhower indicated he was
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However, there is no indication of what the alert entailed or
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Europe: "We do not look upon these nations as potential
military allies." The next day, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
spoke to the United Nations Security Council and quoted Dulles'
words from the previous day. Lodge expressed hopes the USSR
would not misunderstand American intentions with regard to the
changing situation in Hungary. On 29 October, Charles Bohlen,
the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, was instructed to assure the
Kremlin leaders officially that Dulles' remarks reflected the
wishes of the President. These statements must have given
ample assurance that the U.S. did not plan to get involved in
134Hungary. The declarations did not limit U.S. actions in
the United Nations.
The situation in the United Nations during the
Hungarian crisis is best described as confused. Since there
were virtually no communications with the Hungarian government,
and changes in that government could not be confirmed, concerned
United Nations members could make only feeble attempts at stir-
ring up interest in the world organization. On 27 October,
France, Great Britain and the U.S. attempted to get the Security
Council to investigate the Hungarian affair. The next day,
before the Council was to meet, Hungary's permanent represent-
ative at the United Nations, Peter Kos , forwarded a declaration
from the Hungarian government protesting "the consideration of
any question concerning the domestic affairs of Hungary." A







carried a proclamation by Imre Nagy. He announced that the
popular uprising was not a counter-revolution. Kos immediately
informed the Council that without further instructions from
his government he reserved the right to speak on Hungarian
affairs at a later date. Without any other speakers, the
135Council adjourned without taking any action.
The United Nations did concern itself with military
activities the very next day - the Suez crisis. The Israelis,
French and British became involved in military action on the
Sinai Peninsula and the rest of the Western world was divided
in its reaction. Unfortunately for the Hungarians, the atten-
tion of the United Nations was directed to events in the Mid-
east during three very crucial days in Hungarian events - 29,
30 and 31 October. It was not until 1 November when Nagy
notified the United Nations of Hungary's withdrawal from the
Warsaw Pact and declared neutrality that the United Nations
again turned to Hungary. Nagy requested that the question of
the neutrality of Hungary and . the defense of that neutrality
be put on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly.
Nagy ' s request was distributed to the members of
the Security Council on the evening of 2 November. The next
day was taken up by much debating. It was not until after
Soviet troops had already intervened on 4 November that the









any seriousness. To add insult to injury, the resolution of
the Security Council that was drafted too late, but that
called for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, was vetoed
137by the Russians.
There are other factors the Soviets must have con-
sidered when assessing possible U.S. responses to a military
intervention in Hungary. The U.S. had been involved in a war
in Korea that had ended only three years before. The American
people would surely not support a move to become involved in
another war so soon. Also, October of 1956 was the final month
of campaigning before the November Presidential election.
Neither candidate could afford to become involved in talk of
war. It was not difficult in the open society of the U.S. for
the Russians to sense the feelings of the American people.
In summary, the Soviet decision to intervene in
Hungary could not really be considered a high risk decision.
Politically and ideologically, the Russians were forced to
intervene to maintain hegemony in Eastern Europe. They were
faced with a situation that could erode their position as
hegemon of the socialist world. Additionally, they were under
pressure from the leaders of other socialist countries worried
about the consequences of a successful Hungarian revolution on
the other governments in Eastern Europe. Militarily, Hungary






The Soviets obviously had the military force
available, even though they misjudged the amount of force
necessary for the first intervention. The first hours of the
Hungarian uprising demonstrated the lack of resolve by the
Hungarian armed forces. The Soviets were aware of the limited
organized military force that could oppose a second interven-
tion.
The concern over the possibility of a Western
military response should have been minimal. Acutely aware of
the U.S. nuclear forces, the Soviets should have gotten the
indications of U.S. intent from "Washingtonology" - the reverse
of Kremlinology . Speeches by the U.S. Secretary of State and
other government officials stressed the fact that the U.S. did
not intend to become militarily involved in Eastern Europe.
The United Nations never aggressively considered the Hungarian
question until after the Soviets had successfully intervened
in Hungary with a strong military force. The Suez crisis dis-
tracted the West and took the pressure temporarily off the
Russians. All of these factors led the Soviet leaders to the
decision to intervene on 4 November. History has recorded
their success.
B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA - 1968
1 . Background
The death of Stalin in 1953 did not generally improve
the lives of the people in Czechoslovakia. The Czech leaders
were old-guard Stalinists who dreaded the idea of any reform.
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However, by the early 1960 's, nationalist factions became
aroused over economic stagnation and social alienation. The
people were dissatisfied with the Czech President and Party
boss - Antonin Novotny. A coalition of economic reformers and
intellectuals united in an attempt to get rid of the pro-Moscow
bureaucrats in the Party, government and trade unions. By
January of 1968, Novotny was replaced by Alexander Dubcek as
General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. By mid
February, the population viewed the government with hopeful
anticipation. They later became excited with talk of political
and economic reforms. Dubcek and the reformers began an effort
to remove front men associated with the Russians from the Party
and the labor unions. Victims of the Stalinist past were
rehabilitated. The pro-Soviet elements in the secret police
were stripped of their power and informers linked to the KGB
were exposed. The possibility for even greater change was
evident when Ludvik Svoboda replaced Novotny as President and
Dubcek gained control of the Central Committee. The Soviet
leaders watched events in Czechoslovakia nervously.
The Soviets displayed their first open disapproval of
Prague's new course in early April, 1968. During a visit by
Dubcek to Moscow in early May, the Soviet leaders expressed
anxiety over events in Czechoslovakia. On 8 May, a meeting
of the party leaders of the "hard-core" Warsaw Pact allies
(GDR, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria) was held in Moscow to
discuss the Czech situation.
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Quite possibly, the Soviet leaders could not decide
on a "solution" to the Czech problem as Kosygin made an un-
expected ten-day visit to that country, arriving 17 May. He
apparently hoped to use personal diplomacy to alleviate the
situation. Concurrent with Kosygin's visit, Marshal Grechko,
Soviet Defense Minister, along with a Soviet military delega-
tion, arrived in Prague for a six-day visit with Czech defense
rr . . , 138officials
.
Grechko apparently took a hard-line approach during
his visit and is reported to have raised the question of sta-
tioning 10,000-12,000 "non-Czechoslovak" troops in Czechoslo-
vakia. The Czechs disagreed on the troop issue but did agree
to permit Warsaw Pact maneuvers - a command post exercise
involving few actual troops - to be held on Czech territory.
139
It was announced Exercise SUMAVA would take place in June.
Czech agreement to the maneuvers was to prove to be a tactical
error for it allowed the introduction of Soviet troops into
the country.
Exercise SUMAVA became more than a command post exer-
cise. In early June, Soviet units began preparation for the
maneuvers and crossed into Czechoslovakia.. They brought with
them armor and tactical air units as well as support units
such as mobile radio stations. The Soviets were followed by
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units from the GDR, Poland and Hungary. Czech officers were
informed about nothing as the Soviets took over such major
installations as the airfield of Milovice. After the exercise
was completed, the troops did not leave Czechoslovakia but
140
rather seemed to "drag their feet" for one reason or another.
According to the Czech Defense Minister, thirty-five
percent of the force participating in the exercise had departed
finally by 10 July. Some sources estimated the number of
Soviet troops still in the country as somewhere near 16,000
men. Some of these troops appeared to be leaving on 13 July
but movement was halted the next day and the troops remained
in Czechoslovakia for the remainder of July. It was a subtle
141
way of applying pressure by the Soviets.
The Soviets were especially concerned with the Czecho-
slovak National Assembly's decision on 27 June to abolish
censorship. Also, Dubcek rejected a summons to attend a Warsaw
Pact meeting in Poland to discuss the Czech situation. On 11
July, Pravda published an article basically attacking the
abolishment of censorship but more importantly it pointed out
the existence of the same rationale for Soviet intervention
that was used in Hungary in 1956. On 15 July, the Soviets -
along with the GDR, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria - drafted a
letter that was really an ultimatum to Dubcek to take care of
140




142the situation in his country or face the consequences. The
war of nerves was intensified.
On 10 July, the Soviets announced the alleged discovery
of arms caches and secret documents "proving" Americans and
West Germans were planning to help subversive elements in
Czechoslovakia. On 23 July, the Soviets announced their forces
were engaged in extensive maneuvers all along the Western
frontiers of the USSR - to include the border with Czechoslo-
vakia. Soon afterwards it was announced East German and Polish
troops were participating in the exercises. There were also
indications that Soviet forces in the GDR, Poland and Hungary
were moving closer to Czechoslovakia. Apparently the Soviet
leadership hoped the Czech leadership would crack under the
«. • 143strain.
Dubcek insisted on a meeting with the Soviet Politboro
and that it be held on Czech soil at Cierna. At that meeting
on 29 July it was apparent that Moscow's pressures had only
solidified the Czechoslovak Party behind Dubcek. After a
tense four-day meeting at Cierna, the Soviet leadership backed
down and ordered withdrawal of their troops from Czechoslovakia.
In addition, many of the demands of the 15 July letter were
dropped. The crisis appeared to have passed when the Soviet
leaders and the four "hard-line" Warsaw Pact members met with
the Czechs on 3 August in Bratislava to endorse the truce
144
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Less than two weeks after the Bratislava meeting, the
Soviets began a round of political-military pressures directed
against the Dubcek regime. On 11 August, it was announced
that another Warsaw Pact exercise had begun immediately after
the large-scale logistics exercise ended 10 August. The new
exercise was to be along the borders of Czechoslovakia. Sev-
eral high-ranking Soviet military figures visited Poland and
the GDR in connection with the new maneuvers and gave clear
145indication Moscow was flexing its muscles again.
On the night of 20-21 August, troops belonging to the
USSR, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria invaded Czech-
oslovakia over four frontiers. There was no Czechoslovak
military resistance as the Czechoslovak Presidium ordered the
army not to fight. Instead, the invaders met with non-violent
resistance. However, it was only a matter of hours before the
Soviet-led force was in complete control of Czechoslovakia.
Military intervention in the affairs of another Eastern European
nation had been successfully carried out by the Soviets.
2 . Soviet Goals and Objectives
Soviet leaders were disturbed over three primary aspects
of the liberalization in Czechoslovakia. First, the intellec-
tuals had called for a multi-party system. Second, the end of
censorship exposed unfavorable aspects of the Soviet oligarchy.
Thirdly, various groups called for a somewhat more independent
145 Ibid., pp. 378-379
146Adam Roberts and Philip Windsor, Czechoslovakia 1968
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foreign policy. However, the Dubcek leadership assured the
Soviet leaders that their country was not going to change its
basic orientation nor would the Party lose control of the
147
situation. It is now known that the Soviet bureaucracy was
divided in their support of the responses advocated by the
policymakers and the bureaucratic and pressure groups. It was
not just a matter of dealing with Czechoslovakia; it was a
matter of what impact the actions taken with respect to Czecho-
slovakia would have on other domestic and foreign policy matters.
In February of 1968, the Soviet foreign policy experts
carried out extensive reviews of the possible effects of the
situation in Czechoslovakia on European political and security
matters. Two possible scenarios were considered. First, if
Czechoslovakia were to be invaded, relations with Western Europe
would be seriously affected, which in turn would increase those
nations' interest in NATO and cooperation with the U.S. on
security matters. The second scenario "allowed" the Prague
Spring to run its course with the Dubcek regime falling into
line behind the Soviet leadership. However, the second scenario
was considered unrealistic as the experts believed Dubcek would
eventually attempt to realign his country with possibly Romania
and Yugoslavia or the West. The stability of Eastern Europe
148
would be at stake. It appeared to some policy-makers that
there was no alternative to a military intervention.
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There were several reasons why an intervention was
advocated. The most basic, of course, was the requirement to
forestall "serious damage to Soviet political, economic and
interests in Eastern Europe." It was feared events in Czecho-
slovakia would jeopardize relations with Comecon and the Warsaw
Pact. The Soviets saw indications that some of their fears
were being realized as Romania and Yugoslavia gave the new
Czechoslovak leadership open diplomatic and political backing.
Tito and Romania's Ceausescu signed a joint communique on 1
June condemning "the pressures, threats and interferences in
the affairs of other states" and stressed "the exclusive right
of each Party to independently fashion its policy in building
149
socialism in its country." The Soviets viewed such state-
ments as a potential threat to their control in other areas
of the socialist bloc. It was even feared by some Soviet
Politboro members that the non-Russian republics of the
Ukraine and Latvia were too exposed to their liberal Czecho-
slovak neighbors and would be encouraged to strive for national
150
communism.
Apparently undecided whether to intervene militarily
or not, the Soviet Politboro tried a mixture of diplomacy and
threat of military force. By the end of July, neither approach
had apparently "hampered" the Dubcek regime. Aware that Dubcek
149 Zdenek Suda, The Czechoslovak Republic (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 132.
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was supported not only by Yugoslavia dnd Romania but also the
majority of the non-ruling Western European Communist parties,
the Soviet Politboro agreed to travel to Cierna in Czechoslo-
vakia for discussions with the Dubcek government. Such a trip
by the Soviet Politboro was unprecedented and reflected the
151 v
seriousness of the event. The Cierna meeting appeared to
produce a temporary solution acceptable to all parties concerned
A "local" solution was sure to eliminate any potential inter-
ference by the West in Eastern European affairs.
Not only did the Soviets not want the U.S. and other
Western powers to become involved in Eastern Europe, they also
did not want to jeopardize relations with the U.S. Though
showing little interest in strategic arms limitations discus-
sions in 1962, the Soviets saw advantages in improving their
relations with the U.S. in 1968. Several factors had changed
the attitudes of the Soviet leadership: Western Europe had
refused to consider a European security conference without full
American and Canadian participation; relations with the Peoples'
Republic of China continued to deteriorate while the Soviets
worried about the traditional nightmare of a two-front threat
by China and NATO; and just as the Soviets hoped to surpass
the U.S. in total number of ICBM's, the U.S. developed its
15 2first ABM - SENTINEL. However, as was the case in Hungary
in 1956, the Soviet leaders' first priority was insuring Russian
hegemony in Eastern Europe.
151
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Events in August of 1968 demonstrated to the Soviets
that their diplomatic efforts were not going to control the
Dubcek regime the way the Soviet Politboro wanted that regime
controlled. Following the Cierna and Bratislava talks, both
Tito and Ceasescu visited Prague. The response by the Czecho-
slovak public was overwhelming, particularly for Tito. Possibly
the Soviets saw the roots for a future Communist Little Entente.
Another event that worried the Soviets took place on 15 August.
It was the meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the formal
constitution of the Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia.
The meeting worried the Soviets because it was an example of
what could be expected at the Fourteenth Congress of the
Czechoslovak Party set to meet on 9 September. The Congress
153
could eliminate the formerly legal basis for intervention.
On 19 August a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee
took place in Moscow and it is possible that at that time the
decision was made to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia.
Several hours later, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin informed Amer-
ican officials that Kosygin was ready to meet with President
Johnson on 30 September for a summit meeting. It was obviously
an attempt by the Russians to give the impression that events
154in Czechoslovakia had no effect on U.S. -Soviet relations.
The Soviets tried to tell the world that the USSR acted with
153Suda, The Czechoslovak Republic
,
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other "fraternal socialist countries" to satisfy "a request
by Party and state leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Re-
public for immediate assistance, including assistance with
armed forces." Unfortunately, the Soviets did not find
sufficient leadership in Czechoslovakia to form a new govern-
ment which would "approve" a "Soviet-assisted" regime.
3. Soviet Military Forces Available
Except for briefly after World War II, Soviet troops
had never been stationed on Czechoslovak soil. It seems un-
usual the Soviets did not leave troops in the country since
Czechoslovakia borders on the Federal Republic of Germany.
If Czechoslovakia had ever withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact, it
would have had a radical effect on the strategic situation in
Central Europe by opening a possible corridor for NATO forces
directly into the side of the USSR. However, the Czechoslovak
government had several times declared their unwillingness to
allow permanent stationing of foreign troops on Czechoslovak
., 156
soil.
The Soviets maintained a strong military presence in
East Germany, Poland and Hungary. (Soviet troops withdrew
from Romania in June of 1968.) The 26 Soviet divisions in
Eastern Europe were maintained at or near combat-strength; 13
of the divisions were tank divisions. It was estimated that
that the 26 divisions could be increased to 70 within a month.
Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe
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In addition to the Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, the
Soviets had 63 divisions in the European USSR (west of the
Ural Mountains and north of the Caucasus) . The 63 divisions
were also combat-ready units.
There was at least one Soviet tactical air army in
East Germany with about 900 tactical aircraft. The Soviet
tactical air forces still contained a significant proportion
of obsolescent aircraft of early and mid-1950 vintage. There
were additional fighter aircraft stationed at bases in the
USSR. The Air Transport Force of the Soviet air forces was
equipped with about 1,500 short and medium range transports
157
and a few heavy transports were in service.
Since the intervention in Czechoslovakia involved
military units from other Warsaw Pact members, a review of
their force is provided. The East German Army had about 85,000
men organized into six divisions. Hungary's army had a strength
of 95,000 men organized into six divisions. Poland had the
largest army of the four, consisting of 185,000 men in 15
divisions. Bulgaria had 125,000 men forming 12 divisions in
158
their army. Not all their forces participated in the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia.
On the night of 20-21 August, troops from the USSR and
its four Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia. The invad-
ing force was initially made up of almost 200,000 men. Fourteen
Soviet divisions were supported by six divisions from the
157The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military




other countries. (Unconfirmed estimates indicated the follow-
ing composition of the East European forces involved: roughly
20,000 East Germans; roughly 20,000 Hungarians; 50,000 Poles;
159
and about 10,000 Bulgarians.) About six of the Soviet
divisions came from East Germany with the remaining eight
probably from Poland, the Ukraine and Hungary. It has been
said that the occupation of Czechoslovakia was one of the best
executed military operations in recent history.
There were several significant observations concerning
the conduct of the entire "Czechoslovak affair." In early
August, General S. M. Shtmenko , Stalin's wartime Chief of Oper-
ations, was recalled from an administrative post to replace the
aging Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact forces. Shtemenko was
/to be in charge of the invasion under the overall command of
the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, General I. G.
Pavlovsky. Interestingly enough, once deployment of all the
military units participating in Exercise SUMAVA was complete
and the troops were in position for maneuvers, command was
transferred from the regular Warsaw Pact headquarters to the
Soviet High Command. It was an indication of the importance
Soviet leaders placed on the activities. (It may also provide
an indication of how the Soviets could carry out future military
159Roberts and Windsor, Czechoslovakia 1968
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operations in which NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries might
be involved.)
As the invasion began, U.S. Air Force radars in West-
ern Europe observed a stream of aircraft moving from Leningrad
to Prague. The stream was the airlift of an entire division -
men, armored vehicles,- fuel and supplies - carried out by 250
Soviet transports. It was the biggest known airlift up to that
time. Air fields had been secured by the first units entering
Czechoslovakia so as to eliminate any potential resistance.
It is possible the Soviets might have anticipated some
Czechoslovak resistance. White stripes were painted along the
top of each invading vehicle so that Soviet fighter aircraft
could identify the "healthy forces." Also, the Soviets had a
large amount of bridging equipment, suggesting they expected
possible sabotage such as destruction of primary bridges.
Armed resistance was not a problem, however.
There was a major problem, however. The prepared inter
vention of Czechoslovakia posed significant technical logistics
problems. John Erickson has pointed out in his studies that
"the key to the invasion. . .was logistics, rather than battle
164troops or anything else." The Soviets spent much time and
effort preparing the military buildup. Not only were regular
units involved in the several exercises conducted prior to the
16 9
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invasion, but also thousands of recruits were called up and
thousands of items of motor transport and other equipment were
mobilized for a big logistics exercise announced on 23 July.
The rear services participated in a maneuvers stretching from
the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The significance is seen
when it is understood that the rear-services exercise was
carried out during midsummer, disrupting the collectives' har-
vests. If the Kremlin leaders had not decided to invade
Czechoslovakia, Western analysts could never explain the Soviet
military actions during the entire summer of 1968. It is quite
possible the cost of "being prepared" was one of the primary
factors in the decision to invade.
There is one other interesting point involving possible
"time and cost." Under the 1967 Soviet Universal Military
Obligation Law, the following length of reserve obligation for
enlisted men and warranted officers applied in 1968:
Class I Class II Class III
(through 34 yrs) (35-44 years) (45-49 years)
4-6 call-ups of 1-2 call-ups of 1 call-up of
3 months each 2 months each 1 month
It is possible that either many Class I reservists were com-
pleting their three-month call-up and the Soviet leaders were
concerned about the cost of replacing them with other reservists
or the Soviet leadership had already called the Class II
James H. Polk, "Reflections on the Czechoslovakian
Invasion, 1968," Strategic Review
, Winter 1977, p. 32.
David A. Smith, "Soviet Military Manpower," Air Force
Magazine, March 1977. p. 81.
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reservists and only had them for two months before the "old
men" were called. Whatever the case was, the Soviets had
assembled a force large enough to handle the invasion.
The invasion force was estimated at about 200,000
troops on 21 August. By 28 August, estimates of foreign
i f\i
troops in Czechoslovakia ran as high as 650,000 to 700,000.
With a force that large, the Soviets were assured of success.
4. The Risks of Intervention - Soviet Perceptions of
of Czechoslovak and U.S. Response
a. Czechoslovak Response
In 1968 it was said the military forces of Czecho-
slovakia on paper formed an important element of the Warsaw
Pact. With a population of 14-1/2 million people, the nation
maintained a quarter of a million men under arms in one type
of organization or another. There were about 175,000 men in
the army, 50,000 men in the air force, plus an additional
40,000 men in para-military organizations such as frontier
guards.
The Czechoslovak Army was made up of five armored
divisions and nine motor-rifle divisions (including an airborne
brigade). The divisions were supported by 2,700 tanks. The
Air Force inventory included 600 tactical aircraft - half for
an interceptor role and half for a ground attack role. There
was a small helicopter force and air transport force. Next to
the Soviet Union itself, Czechoslovakia was probably the best
equipped military force in the Warsaw Pact.
Roberts and Windsor, Czechoslovakia 1968
,
p. 107.





The Soviets must have been a bit wary of the
Czechoslovak armed forces, as invading units did take some
precautions as was indicated above. Additionally, the Soviets
had lowered the Czechoslovak's fuel and ammunition stocks by
transferring those supplies to East Germany for more "exer-
169
cises." Soviet intelligence must have observed that the
Czechoslovak armed forces were not deployed, and could not be
redeployed for operations designed to resist an invasion from
the east. The Czechoslovak military intelligence was concerned
with the west and not with the intentions of their allies (?)
170
to the east. Nevertheless, the Czechoslovak leadership
ordered the Czechoslovak Army not to fight.
Maybe the Soviets hoped the Czechoslovak military
would take up positions against an attack from the east. Then
the Soviets would have had an excuse to destroy the "threat"
and gain control of the country even earlier than it did. How-
ever, Dubcek kept reassuring the Soviets that he was in complete
control. He knew the consequences if he allowed an appearance
of military action being taken by his government,
b. Response by Western Powers
To understand what the anticipated Western responses
would be to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR, it is
necessary to understand what an invasion of that country would
have created for the Western world. The main factor is that
169Roberts and Windsor, Czechoslovakia 1968
,
p. 110.





the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and even the large scale
exercises conducted during the summer of 1968, did not really
affect the balance of power in Europe. It did affect the
power structure, or disposition of forces in Europe, and that
was a concern for Western defense planners.
General Polk, Commander of the U.S. Army in Europe
during the Czechoslovak crisis, recently indicated that no
precautionary instructions had been issued to the military
commanders in Europe by either the U.S. or NATO chains of com-
mand. Standing instructions had been issued as early as July
instructing commanders not to become involved in the internal
political struggles of Czechoslovakia by allowing increased
patrolling and activities near the Czechoslovak border. In
other words, the military was to avoid any sort of incident.
When the Soviet invasion did take place in August, most of
the NATO defense ministers and their staffs were scattered
171
across Europe on their annual August holiday. Surely the
Soviet intelligence agents were aware of all those facts.
As mentioned earlier, the Soviets were concerned
that the intervention in Czechoslovakia would strengthen NATO
by driving independent-minded Europeans back into the arms of
the U.S. Some Soviet analysts feared the invasion would have
an effect on the U.S. Presidential campaign and aid the Nixon
172
campaign. Yet, it really appears the Soviets might not
171
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have expected much of a reaction from the West at all. It
was an internal matter for the socialist bloc and the Soviets
were going to solve it - without Western help.
In summary, the Soviet decision to intervene in Czechoslo-
vakia could not really be considered a high risk decision.
Politically, the Soviets felt it was absolutely necessary to
put an end to Dubcek's liberalism. Not only did it challenge
the control of the Soviets in Eastern Europe but also had the
potential to affect the balance of power. The loss of Czecho-
slovakia to the socialist bloc would create grave problems for
the defense of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact members.
The Soviets obviously took a lesson from the intervention
in Hungary in 1956. They were determined to have a force strong
enough to achieve their goal on the "first attempt." By includ-
ing units from other Warsaw Pact nations in the invasion force,
the Soviets were able to give the appearance of both legality
and togetherness in solving a problem in the affairs of the
entire socialist bloc. Once the decision was made to intervene,
the Soviets achieved their goal militarily in a matter of hours.
The impact of world opinion and the possibility of a Western
reaction was not really a problem in 1968. By that time the
USSR had become an acknowledged nuclear power and they were
not intimidated as easily as they were in the 1950's. The U.S.
and other major pwoers were more willing to allow the USSR to
take care of its own problems.
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C. ANGOLA - 1975-1976
1 . Background
History has recorded Portugal's presence in Africa
for almost 500 years. Yet it was not until 1961 that fighting
erupted in Angola against colonial rule. This early fighting
evolved from a widespread revolt of the Bakongo people inspired,
but haphazardly prepared, in Zaire (Congo) . Following Portu-
guese retaliation, warfare slowly developed in the northern
part of Angola. The leader of the rebels, Holden Roberto,
formed the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) whose
support remained centered mainly among the Bokongo people who
made up twenty percent of the nearly six million Africans in
Angola. 173
Angola, unfortunately, suffered from a three-way
rivalry. In the mid- 1950' s, another movement - the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) - began and was
associated with Angolan and Portuguese Communists. The support
for the MPLA came from the intellectuals, the African slum
dwellers around the capital city, Luanda, and from the Mbundu
people - a people constituting twenty-five percent of the pop-
ulation and living in the region east of Luanda. While the
MPLA did participate in revolts in 1961, it was eventually
weakened by factionalism and other setbacks. By 1966, the
MPLA leader, Agosteno Neto, was able to gather enough support
to launch insurgency campaigns in northern and eastern Angola
with some degree of success.
173 sThomas H. Henriksen, "Angola and Mozambique: Interven-
tion and Revolution," Current History
, November 1976, p. 153.
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A third nationalist movement was formed in 1966 by
Jonas Savimbi following personality and ethnic disagreements
within the FNLA. The new movement, the National Union for
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was based among the larg-
est ethno- linguistic group (forty percent of the Angolan popu-
lation); however, it did not have access to any neighboring
state for supplies and training areas. As a result, its
174
military capabilities did not match its popularity.
While it is true that the three insurgent groups were
separated due to their ethnic differences, the history of their
survival also had an effect on relations with one another.
During the 1950' s, prior to the outbreak of insurgent activity
in 1961, the Portuguese authorities attempted to eliminate
individuals suspected of nationalistic sympathies. The move-
ments suffered from limited leadership as well as travel re-
strictions, police harassment and lack of funds. Thus, their
range of action and "political vision" were limited. They
remained parochial and were unable to escape their ties of
ethnic and regional loyalties. Forced to operate clandestinely,
175the insurgents were distrustful of one another.
In April 1974, a military coup in Portugal overthrew
that government. That was the spark that ignited the increased
struggle for independence in Angola. By late 1974, the new




175John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," Foreign Affairs
,
April 1976, p. 409.
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the three Angolan insurgent movements - accorded political
legitimacy by the Portuguese - fought for political and mil-
itary power. With the collapse of Portuguese authority in
Angola, there were obvious enticements to outside intervention.
Outside support of the three insurgent movements did
not begin only after the coup in Portugal. Each of the move-
ments had been receiving outside assistance, sometimes from
more than one source, for several years. It was this pre-coup
assistance that set the stage for the fighting in Angola in
1975 and 1976. The Soviet Union had furnished limited support
to the MPLA from the 1960 's to 1973. They supported the MPLA
for three reasons: first, because the MPLA leaders had ex-
pressed the most radical form of socialism; second, because
the Portuguese Communist Party had shown active support for
the MPLA; and third, because the posture of the FNLA was so
anti-communist. However, in 1973 the Soviets sharply re-
duced their assistance when it appeared the movement would not
be successful due to internal squabbles. The MPLA had also
received limited support from Cuba from as early as 1965.
The FNLA, although avowedly non-socialist, on the other
hand, received material support from the Chinese beginning in
1973. The support included a 120-man training mission headed
by a Chinese major-general. Able to use Zaire as a refuge,
the FNLA worked toward developing a material superiority while
lacking in political strength. UNITA also received aid from
1 7 f\
F. Stephen Larrabee, "Moscow and Angola," Radio Liberty
Special Report, RL 490/75, 26 November 1975, p. 4.
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China, but it involved only a very small amount of training,
177financial support and publicity.
In mid-1974, following the coup in Portugal, FNLA
received- tons of arms from China, as well as instructors.
With Chinese help, the FNLA was able to achieve military pri-
macy among the three insurgent movements. It was ironic that
China would support a non-socialist movement, yet it appears
that the Chinese wanted to acquire influence in East Africa
as well as to embarrass the Soviets who had supported the MPLA.
By the end of 1974 - October or November - the Soviets
renewed modest arms shipments to the MPLA. The USSR was ob-
viously concerned that China would have an opportunity for
178political and ideological gain in Africa. The Soviets
could see the possibility for civil war growing in Angola.
In an effort to avoid a full-scale civil war in Angola,
the Portuguese government flew the leaders of the three insur-
gent movements to Alvor in southern Portugal in January 1975
for a meeting. An accord - the Alvor Accord - was signed by
the three leaders and representatives of the Portuguese govern-
ment which set a date for independence in Angola - 11 November
1975. (At the time of the meeting in Portugal, the U.S.
covertly gave the FNLA a grant of $300,000) 179
177









It was hoped the Alvor Accord would bring about a
relaxation in tensions and an end to fighting. However, just
the opposite happened. Fighting broke out almost immediately.
In addition, Soviet deliveries of arms and supplies were in-
tensified. In fact, the amount of Soviet aid changed the
entire complexion of the conflict in Angola. The weapons
which the Soviets provided the MPLA included:
...various light and heavy machine guns; submachine guns;
grenades; AK-47 rifles; Kalashnikov assault rifles; Simonov
semi-automatic carbines; 12mm mortars; 24mm and 75 mm
recoiless rifles; 75mm, 82mm, 107mm recoiless guns;
Katyushin rockets; 37mm, 14.5mm antiaircraft machine guns;
107mm and 122mm ground-to-ground rockets; T-34 and T-54
tanks; new PT-76 amphibious tanks; armored cars; personnel
carriers; 108mm recoiless antitank guns; antivehicle and
antitank mines; helicopter gunships* MIG-21's; and hand-
held SAM-7 antiaircraft missiles. 1°0
At least six shiploads of military equipment for the
MPLA arrived from Cuba early in 1975. Additionally, thirty-
eight flights of Soviet AN-22 transport aircraft flew to
Luanda - Angola's capital - following stopovers in Guinea.
Four Russian ships, as well as Bulgarian ships and a Yugoslav
ship, arrived at Luanda with arms. It was reported that 600
tons of military equipment were seen in Tanzania awaiting mov.e-
181
ment to MPLA forces.
The supply of arms to the MPLA continued through the
spring. However, a new problem came to light - the MPLA in-
surgents did not know how to use the sophisticated weapons
supplied them. In June, the first Cuban advisors - 230 strong -
18 Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "The Soviet Intervention
in Angola: Intentions and Implications," Strategic Review
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arrived in Angola to establish MPLA training camps. By
September, two months before the proposed independence date
of November 11, the military aid provided by the Russians and
Cubans was enough to guarantee the MPLA military supremacy.
In mid-August, the leftist government in Portugal was
on the verge of collapse and began to move away from the com-
munists. Cuba reacted quickly and put together a military
force to send to Angola. Three Cuban troop ships arrived in
eastern Africa in late September and early October.
Other "outside" troops entered Angola in August when
South Africans crossed into that country, apparently to pro-
tect the hydroelectric projects on the Cumene River. However,
in late October the South Africans sent an armored column into
Angola in support of a UNITA-FLNA alliance. The column advanced
rapidly and in early December mauled the Cuban forces it en-
countered.
The appearance of a South African armored column set
off the next stage of the Cuban buildup. Four or five Cuban
ships left Cuba in late October and a troop airlift began on
November 7. Cuban defeats by the armored force brought an
influx of new Cuban soldiers to Angola, estimated at 400 per
18 3
week to about 1,000 per week in January.
South Africa's assistance backfired for the UNITA-FLNA
alliance. The censure of the Soviet-Cuban intervention by
18 2William J. Durch, "The Cuban Military in Africa and the
Middle East: From Algeria to Angola," Center for Naval Analyses,





several African nations never came about because of the emotions
that were aroused throughout Africa when the coalition coopera-
184
ted with the apartheid government of South Africa. South
Africa forces withdrew from Angola in late March 1976 as a
result of growing domestic pressure, an increase in Cuban num-
bers and firepower and the ending of U.S. aid to FNLA and UNITA
as a result of U.S. Congressional action.
On 11 November 1975, the MPLA announced the creation of
the People's Republic of Angola. The USSR and other socialist
states gave immediate recognition to the government. Interest-
ingly, the Chinese had withdrawn their personnel from training
camps in Zaire in July nominally in response to a call for
neutrality among the three rival factions in Angola. Actually,
the Chinese could not compete with the massive aid program
carried out by the Soviets and Cubans.
The large supply of Soviet weapons and Cuban soldiers -
estimated to be 13,500 Cuban regulars in early 1976 - brought
about the defeat of the FNLA and the UNITA. By March 1976,
the heavy fighting in the Angola war was over. However, fight-
ing did continue as the remnants of the UNITA armed force began
18 5
a limited guerrilla struggle. While there is little chance
the MPLA victory will be reversed, guerrilla activities against
the MPLA government have, and will continue to have, a destabil-
izing effect.





2 . Soviet Goals and Objectives
It would be ridiculous to argue that the USSR needed
a socialist government in power in Angola. The fact that a
socialist government came to power as a result of Soviet
assistance is important to the USSR, but that came about as
a result of the Soviets achieving other more important objec-
tives. Soviet objectives in Angola were mainly those of
strategic-political nature. Primarily, there were three
objectives: weaken the influence of China - and the United
States - in Africa; improve the image of the USSR in the Third
World; and gain access to the strategically important area of
Eastern Africa - both for its strategically important location
and its reserves of raw materials.
While the USSR is extremely self-sufficient in vital
raw materials, it would prefer to conserve those resources and
acquire them elsewhere. In effect, they want to save their
capability for self-sufficiency for a time of crisis. Southern
Africa could provide the Soviets with access to enormous re-
serves of raw materials. Just as important to the Soviets is
the goal of limiting or eliminating Western access to raw
materials in the Third World. The energy crisis in the West
has shown the importance of raw materials to national security.
The strategic geographical location of Angola is also
an important factor that could have an impact on the national
security of Western nations. One major objective of the Soviets
p. 95.
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is the deepwater shipping facilities at Lobito and Luanda.
Both ports would be capable of servicing Soviet Naval and
merchant vessels. Excellent submarine facilities could be
constructed at Bahia dos Tigres which has an excellent deep-
water anchorage. Such facilities could threaten the Cape of
Africa oil route, as well as provide a "jumping Off" point for
Soviet activities in the South Atlantic towards South America.
Besides port facilities, Angola has at least three modern air
fields which can easily be enlarged to accommodate long range
18 7Soviet aircraft.
Since the rift between China and the USSR became
publicized in 1960, the Soviets have been forced to devote
much of their foreign policy efforts to minimizing and con-
taining Chinese influence, both in the Socialist world and
among the emerging nations. Following the Soviet intervention
in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Chinese went to great efforts
to ridicule the Soviets for interfering in the affairs of an
independent state. As a result, the image of the USSR was
tarnished among the Third World nations. China, in the mean-
time, for several years had been devoting much effort to
developing ties with new governments in Africa. When it ap-
peared the Chinese might have the opportunity to emerge from
the Angolan affair as supporters of the victorious insurgent
faction, the Soviets moved quickly. They wanted not only to




Chinese by demonstrating to the African nations that the
Chinese were not capable of providing the large amounts of
aid that the Soviets could.
The Soviet objectives with regard to the U.S. were
very much different than those with respect to China. The
Soviets most certainly felt boxed in by the climate of detente
between the U.S. and USSR. Angola provided the USSR the oppor-
tunity to not only demonstrate its capability to project its
foreign policy on a global basis but also demonstrated that
detente did not restrict the Soviet Union from supporting "wars
of liberation."
The Soviet concern over the effect of detente most
certainly had an impact on the decision to support the MPLA
in Angola. The Twenty-Fifth Party Congress was scheduled to
meet just after the Angolan civil war began. Since it was the
first Congress since 1972 and the beginning of detente with
the U.S., it is possible that Brezhnev was particularly aware
of how the Soviet leadership would perceive the Soviet position
on Angola. If he pursued a "hands off" approach, he would have
been criticized by those in the Soviet leadership who believed
detente inhibited the ability of the USSR to "assist their
188
clients in the Third World." On the other hand, a firm
commitment in Angola would have demonstrated to the Soviet
leadership as well as the rest of. the world that detente would
not keep the USSR from pursuing its goal of world socialism.
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3. Military Forces Available
The Soviets demonstrated during the Angolan Civil War
that they were, in fact, a global power. The military force
available to them included a navy capable of "blue-water"
operations, a strategic airlift capability, and a "storehouse"
of modern conventional weapons available for use by the Soviet-
supported factions in the Third World. The Soviet intervention
in Angola involved an array of modern "Soviet weapons, training,
technicians, combat troops, including pilots from the Soviet
allies, Algeria and Cuba, an enormous air and sea lift, Cuban
assault vessels and unconfirmed reports of Soviet warships
189firing on anti-Soviet forces."
The USSR also demonstrated the capacity to employ a
global network of influence to support an operation in a country
as isolated as Angola. Ships from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia
delivered arms to the African nations. Mozambique sent 250
veteran troops to assist the Soviets. Congo-Brazzaville pro-
vided a staging area for two squadrons of Soviet MIG-21's.
190Transport planes were allowed to refuel at Conakry. Last,
but not least, were the Cuban troops which provided the MPLA
with a numerically superior force.
When the Cubans provided troops to fight with the MPLA
in Angola, it was believed that the Cubans were acting as the
mercenaries of the USSR in a war by proxy. The Soviet leader-











combat troops on the ground in Angola. Unlike Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, Angola was not geographically "attached" to
the USSR nor was Angola a part of the Socialist bloc. The
question remains then, "how hard did the Soviets have to push
the Cubans" to get them to commit such a large number of troops
to the effort in Africa? As indicated earlier, the Cubans had
been supporting the MPLA since as early as 1965. In addition,
success in emerging nations like Angola could only help Castro's
image among the Third World nations. Nevertheless, the point
remains that the arms used by the Cubans (and by the MPLA) were
supplied by the Soviets.
While the Soviets supposedly never used their own troops
on Angolan soil, they took advantage of the opportunity to
demonstrate the capability of deploying a small naval force
off the coast of Angola. Three ships, including a destroyer,
were sent to the vicinity of Angola while a cruiser was deployed
191
off Conakry. It is unknown whether the naval force would
quickly have evacuated that part of the ocean if a Western naval
force would have approached with the possible intent of inter-
vention. The fact remains, the Soviet force was apparently not
challenged, with the end result that the African nation saw a
visible show of force by the Soviets.
In summary, the Soviets demonstrated in Angola a global
capability that had not been observed before. Providing every-
thing needed in the way of modern military supplies and armament,
191 Ibid., p. 100.
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and relying on Cubans and MPLA forces to carry out the fight-
ing, the Soviets have indicated that the USSR is capable of
carrying out military operations below the nuclear level with-
out directly confronting the U.S. As this study is written,
the Soviets are involved in similar operations in Ethiopia.
The West may well be seeing a new Soviet strategy unfolding
which will involve emerging Third World nations acquiring
Soviet political and conventional military support. The U.S.
may find that it can only involve itself at the risk of esca-
lating military activities in the emerging states to a direct
U.S. -Soviet confrontation.
4. The Risks of Intervention - Soviet
Perceptions of U.S. Response
The Soviet decisions to support the MPLA in Angola
most assuredly was made after weighing the risks involved. In
retrospect, there were many indicators which must have given
the Soviets the signal that they were not risking a U.S. -Soviet
confrontation. In fact, the Soviets "received" such indicators
throughout the entire Angolan affair.
In 1974, as the civil war in Angola began to explode,
the U.S. was still recovering from the embarrassment of its
loss in Vietnam. The government and the public were tired of
fighting an unpopular war half-way around the world and did
not want the U.S. to become involved in another such conflict.
To most Americans, Angola "did not exist."
The U.S. government, in January 1975, apparently took
its first real look at events in Angola. At that time the
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National Security Council authorized a covert grant to the
FNLA of $300,000. The rumors soon spread that there was "heavy
192
continuing CIA support for the FNLA." In July, in an effort
to avoid "a public confrontation" with Congress, the U.S.
Administration began a program to beef up the FNLA and UNITA.
By the end of the year, more than $30 million in military hard-
193
ware had been sent to the two insurgent groups.
By late 1975, the Angola issue came to a head in the
U.S. Senate. Informed of the U.S. covert aid provided to Angola
earlier in the year, several Senators - in a fit of conscience
and with worry over the coming election year - voted to ban
further covert aid to Angola. The following month, January
1976, the House of Representatives followed the Senate's
example.
To the Soviets, it must have seemed that they perceived
virtually no risks in Angola. The U.S. President never tried
to use the "hot line" to settle the Angola affair. The U.S.
did not even threaten to delay SALT negotiations or stop grain
194
sales to the USSR. More importantly, the U.S. never tried
to match - step by step - the amount and quality of aid the
Soviets provided the MPLA.
The Soviets achieved a highly symbolic "victory" in
their support of the MPLA in Angola. They demonstrated the
capability to project their foreign policy beyond their own
192Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," p. 414-415.







shores with a global military capability. Additionally, they
demonstrated that they can achieve major foreign gains with
little risk.
....Angola is an example of a graduated, relatively low
cost, carefully orchestrated expansion of Soviet influ-
ence; it is a limited military confrontation, a proxy
war.... It is virtually a new instrument of foreign
policy. 195
/




Historically, the Russians have always maintained a large
standing army for defense of the Motherland. Consequently,
the emphasis was generally on the ground forces, particularly
the infantry. However, since World War II and with the advent
of the atomic bomb, the Soviet defense establishment has car-
ried out changes in both organization and weapons capabilities
through four phases of development. In each of the four phases
can be seen changes in the priority of the development of con-
ventional military forces, as well as changes in the attitude
of the Soviet leadership toward the importance of conventional
military force.
The first post-World War II phase covered the period from
the end of the war to Stalin's death in 1953. During that
phase, Stalin continued to stress the importance of a strong
continental army. The emergence of the U.S. as an atomic power
forced the Soviet leadership to put an increased emphasis on
acquiring a nuclear weapon capability. However, while the
Soviets did explode their first atomic device during this phase,
the Soviet military remained a continental force.
The second phase of Soviet military development began in
1953, following the death of Stalin, and continued until early
1960. It was during this period that the Soviets began to
acquire nuclear weapons. However, Soviet strategy continued
to stress the traditional ground forces while the military
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leadership, having followed the strategy set forth by Stalin
himself for so many years, slowly began to question the impact
of nuclear weapons on military strategy as a whole. Therefore,
modern weapons - such as ballistic missiles - were developed
for short and medium ranges rather than intercontinental ranges.
The Soviets were required to completely reevaluate their mili-
tary strategy.
January of 1960 ushered in the third phase of Soviet mili-
tary development. Khrushchev's decision to stress the develop-
ment and stockpiling of nuclear weapons broke with the tradition
of maintaining and emphasizing a conventional ground army.
While the conventional forces did not wither away during the
phase, the strategic nuclear forces were given the number one
priority in weapons and force development.
The fourth phase began in about 1967 when the Soviet leader-
ship became aware of both the potential danger of using nuclear
capabilities to support foreign policy and the announcement
that the U.S. was changing its strategy to include both nuclear
and conventional forces - "flexible response." Since 1967, the
Soviets have continued to place first priority on strategic
nuclear forces but have built up a tremendous conventional
capability that includes the army, navy, tactical air and air-
lift forces. While maintaining a strategic nuclear balance -
or even achieving some degree of nuclear superiority - the
Soviets have acquired a conventional capability which can be
used to support foreign policy efforts below the level of
direct U.S. -USSR relationships.
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The emergence of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power - one
of the two superpowers - in world affairs has placed an un-
acceptable degree, of risk in pursuing a foreign policy which
could develop into a nuclear confrontation with the U.S. In
a future war involving a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and
USSR, both sides would suffer tremendous losses. Therefore,
the Soviet leaders have come to realize that the political
utility of nuclear weapons has declined over the past several
years. The risks of a nuclear conflict have forced the Soviets
to use other means to demonstrate their resolve in carrying out
their foreign policy. They have demonstrated the importance of
conventional military force as "useable" force capable of
supporting foreign policy goals and objectives.
Conventional military force, enhanced by a strong nuclear
force, can be deployed in several ways. As demonstrated in
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets employed
conventional forces to ensure Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe
and to maintain the structure of the Warsaw Pact. As demon-
strated in Angola in 1974 and 1975, the Soviets deployed their
conventional military capabilities on behalf of their "clients"
- the MPLA. While Soviet troops did not participate in the
fighting themselves, the Soviets provided the arms and the
transportation of the weaponry to the area of conflict. In all
three of these examples, the Soviet Union demonstrated its re-
solve to support a socialist world. Additionally, in each of
the interventions the Soviets were able to achieve their foreign
policy goals with little or no risk.
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In Hungary, the Soviet leadership was faced with an actual
revolution of the Hungarian people. The Warsaw Pact was still
young enough that the Soviets could really not rely on "support"
from other member nations. The decision to intervene was made
easier by several factors: the Americans were in the final
weeks of a Presidential campaign; the U.S. Secretary of State
had announced publicly that the U.S. would not intervene in
Eastern Europe, and, to take the world interest away from
Hungary, France and Great Britain landed troops in the Suez
Canal area. Although the first Soviet use of their armed
forces in Hungary was not sufficient to completely put down
the Hungarian insurgents, the Soviet leadership made sure the
second intervention was on a large enough scale to snuff out
all resistance. World reaction was verbal only and the Soviets
went about their business as they saw fit.
In Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet leadership deployed
not only Soviet troops but troops from four other Warsaw Pact
countries. The first "intervention" did not involve armed
conflict but demonstrated the Soviets' awareness that conven-
tional forces can be employed as a show of force in an effort
to coerce another nation to follow the desires of the USSR.
Initially deployed throughout Czechoslovakia on maneuvers,
Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces remained in and near that nation
for weeks following the conclusion of the maneuvers. Dubcek,
however, did not take Moscow's "hint" and continued to pursue
a policy of liberalization. Before the Czechoslovak popula-
tion could go to the polls and publicly indicate their support
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of Dubcek's policies, the Soviets had to intervene. The
intervention happened swiftly and with a force so large that
it would have been useless for Czechoslovakia to resist. It
is interesting to note that the Soviet leadership deployed
conventional forces before the Soviets had even found a
"government" in Czechoslovakia to support Soviet policy. The
risks involved in the 1968 intervention were minimal. First,
the Soviets deployed a force of tremendous size involving
troops from four other Warsaw Pact nations. The joint effort
gave the appearance of "fraternal socialist nations: working
together to solve a problem which did not involve the West.
The U.S., as in 1956, was in the latter months of a presidential
campaign and the Soviets had no reason to believe U.S. attitudes
toward Eastern Europe had changed much since 1956. In addition,
the U.S. was deeply involved in Vietnam. There were several
indications that the U.S. and Western Europe did not want to
get involved nor did they want to give the Soviets the impres-
sion that Western military units were responding to events in
Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet participation in Angola in 1974 and 1975 dif-
fered from the Hungarian and Czechoslovak crises in several
ways. First, the Soviets were supporting a military action
far away from their Eastern European "backyard." They demon-
strated a global capability in providing arms to a client on
another continent. More importantly, they showed the determin-
ation to supply armies sufficiently to achieve their goals. In
addition, the Soviets carried out a war by proxy - letting Cuban
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military units do the fighting - in support of the MPLA in
Angola. The world could not accuse the Soviets of having
troops in combat. The Soviets demonstrated to the emerging
nations of the world that they can rely on the Soviet Union
for support. The risks involved were minimal. The Soviets,
operating outside the USSR-Eastern European area, did not con-
front the U.S. in an area of "declared" U.S. interest. As
mentioned above, the Soviets did not employ Soviet troops in
Angola, therefore avoiding world criticism on that point. The
Soviet leadership always had the ability to "pull back" if the
need arose - if Soviet warships encountered another naval
force, the Soviet ships could have withdrawn from the area; if
world pressure became too great, or there was the possibility
the U.S. might intervene, the Soviets could halt their airlift
and sealift of supplies to Angola. However, the U.S. was still
recovering from the long campaign in Vietnam and the U.S. public
was not about to let Congress involve their country in another
far-off conflict.
In summary, the conventional military force has always been
an important tool for Soviet leadership. While military strat-
egy changed with the advent of nuclear warfare, conventional
military force remained the principal instrument for pursuing
foreign policy goals where military force is to be used at all.
Through the development of a large, versatile force capable of
carrying out military operations below the nuclear level, the
Soviets have added "teeth" to their foreign policy. While a
nuclear stalemate between the U.S. and USSR reduces, if not
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eliminates, the possibility of a nuclear war, conventional
forces provide the Soviets the ability to project their power,
particularly in those matters not directly involving a con-
frontation with the U.S. However, the size and scope of the
Soviet improvements in their conventional forces - particularly
those facing NATO - has caused alarm throughout the West. It
appears the Soviet goal is to achieve both nuclear and conven-
tional military superiority so their foreign policy objectives
will be supported at all levels of the military spectrum.
General Alexander Haig, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe,
has said that the Soviet increases in conventional forces
"reflect... a determined, sustained effort over the past
decade. ..."
Today that determined effort has procured for the USSR
a military posture quantitatively superior to that of the
West in many key areas, and consequently increasing in
technological sophistication. .. .Most important, the emer-
gence of these capabilities has been accompanied by the
development of a modern expanded production base capable
of fielding military hardware in greater quantities and
of greater sophistication than we have ever previously
observed. 196
Thus, conventional force remains an important element of
Soviet foreign policy. The massive buildup in recent years may
be an indication of future Soviet aggressiveness in world
affairs. General George S. Brown summed up the situation when
he spoke before Congress early in 1978. "What the Soviets are
1 97doing is unsettling, principally because none of us knows why."
196Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Conventional Force Buildup,"
Aviation Week § Space Technology , 15 August 1977, p. 47.
197Eugene Kozicharow, "US Warned on Balance of Power Shift,"





conventional weapons - non-nuclear weapons.
mobility - The quality or capability of military forces which
permits them to move from place to place while retain-
ing the ability to fulfill their primary mission. 199
strategic mobility - The capability to deploy and sustain
military forces worldwide in support of national
strategy. 200
Soviet military doctrine - M ...a system of guiding views and
directives of a state on the characters of wars in
given specific historical conditions, the determina-
tion of the military tasks of the state, the armed
forces and the principles of their structuring; and
also the methods and forms of solving all these tasks,
including the armed struggle, which flow from the
goals of war and the socio-economic and military
possibilities of the country. " 201
Soviet military strategy - "...is a system of scientific
knowledge dealing with the laws of war as an armed
conflict in the name of definite class interests.
Strategy - on the basis of military experience,
military and political conditions, economic and moral
potential of the country, new means of combat, and
the views and potential of the probable enemy -
studies the conditions and the nature of future war,
the methods for its preparation and conduct, the
services of the armed forces and foundation for their
strategic utilization, as well as foundations for the
material and technical support and leadership of the
war and the armed forces." 202
j no
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms
,
(Washington, D.C.: Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 3 September 1974), p. 87.





S. N. Kozlov, The Officer's Handbook (Moscow: Voyenizdat,
1971), p. 68, quoted in Harriet Fast Scott, "Editor's Introduc-
tion" to Soviet Military Strategy , Third ed. , by V. D. Sokolovskiy
(New York: Crane, Russak § Co., Inc., 1968), p. xviii.





Note: In the words of Mrs. Harriet F. Scott:
"Soviet military doctrine is the political course of
the Communist Party and the Soviet state in the mili-
tary sphere. .. .Military doctrine stems from party
decisions, and military strategy must be consistent
with approved doctrine." 203
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